Rights come alive - Tan Eng Hong v AG

A couple of days ago I wrote a post on the legal significance of the Court of Appeal decision in Tan Eng Hong v AG (2012).  The point that I highlighted was on the interpretation of Article 4 of our Constitution.  This is a follow-up post.

There is another significant ruling made by the Court of Appeal in this case and it would have far reaching consequences for other Constitutional cases. 

The Court of Appeal has effectively stated that in some instances, the very existence of an unconstitutional law is sufficient to give rise to the violation of constitutional rights.  The AG was contending that there must be a present prosecution under the particular law before it can be asserted that there was a violation of constitutional rights.  The Court of Appeal has flatly rejected this:


 "At the same time, and for the avoidance of doubt, we state conclusively that we also reject the proposition that a subsisting prosecution under an allegedly unconstitutional law must be demonstrated in every case before a violation of constitutional rights can be shown. A law is either constitutional or it is not. The effects of a law can be felt without a prosecution, and to insist that an applicant needs to face a prosecution under the law in question before he can challenge its constitutionality could have the perverse effect of encouraging criminal behaviour to test constitutional issues. Even though a violation of constitutional rights may be most clearly shown where there is a subsisting prosecution under an allegedly unconstitutional law, we find that a violation may also be established in the absence of a subsisting prosecution. In certain cases, the very existence of an allegedly unconstitutional law in the statute books may suffice to show a violation of an applicant’s constitutional rights."

Thus, if Parliament enacts a discriminatory criminal offence, a person can challenge the law even though he/she may not have been prosecuted for the offence.  This applies generally to all offences and not merely s.377A.  VK Rajah JA goes on to explain:

"We add that while there is no right not to be prosecuted, there is a right not to be prosecuted under an unconstitutional law. Persons who act in ways that may cause them to be liable under an allegedly unconstitutional law are in the unenviable position of waiting to see whether a prosecution will be brought against them despite the alleged unconstitutionality of the law. The waiting and the uncertainty in itself can be said to be a form of suffering, "

What's wrong with you Mr Wong?

During the time that I was practising (and even thereafter), I had not come across any instance where a Law Society representive turned up in a court to raise the issue of the competency of a lawyer to carry on with the proceedings.  As lawyers, we are hung up (more than anything else) on procedural rules.  Being mindful of procedure is second nature to lawyers.  It was, therefore, surprising to find out that Mr Wong Siew Hong (the head of the sub-committee for Member Care in the Law Society), turned up in court with a letter written by a medical professional.  (The propriety of that disclosure by the medical professional is a separate issue and ought to be properly examined by the Singapore Medical Council.  But, there might be justification based on a pre-existing direction for M Ravi to be examined by a medical professional in relation to his condition.)

What shocked me the most was the fact that whilst Mr Wong might be characterised as having had "good intentions" (as stated by the Law Society), it is unpardonable that after being rebuffed by Justice Pillai in the morning, he still proceeded to adopt the same method of interfering with proceedings in two other matters involving M Ravi's firm.  It does not help that the 3 cases that he attempted to intervene in were political cases.  Public perception of the Law Society is bound to get seriously damaged by these actions of Wong. 

The three attempted interventions (based on reports that have surfaced so far):

a)  The Hougang by-election case
b)  The SDP illegal assembly case
c)   The IMF loan judicial review case

Of course, it might have in all probability been a mere coincidence that on the day that Wong received information of M Ravi's condition, there were legal proceedings with political overtones going on.  But, the problem is that as a matter of public perception, Wong's real intention doesn't matter.  He should have addressed his mind to this and not acted hastily.  Fine.  He may have lapsed somewhat when he turned up before Justice Pillai.  He might have sincerely felt that he was duty bound to alert the court of Ravi's condition so as to protect the interest of the litigant.  But, after Justice Pillai had rightly pointed out that Ravi has a valid practising certificate and the Court would not enquire beyond that, Wong should have gotten back to the LS Council to take the proper procedural steps.  Instead, Wong attempted (reportedly) on two further occasions to intervene in Ravi's court proceedings. 

I am glad that the President of the Law Society has come forward to clarify that Wong acted on his own volition.  At this stage I do not expect the Law Society to publicly chastise Wong.  But, after thoroughly investigating this fiasco, the Law Society must in some way take Wong to task.  The legal profession does not look very good when a Law Society representative goes on a frolic of his own to intervene in court proceedings without making any formal application.  The fact that Wong did not cease in his intervention attempt despite a rebuff from Justice Pillai is unacceptable whichever way one might try to justify it as a case of  'good intentions'. 

The Law Society itself got its facts wrong initially (which was itself somewhat comedic).  But, I am willing to cut the Society some slack on that.  But, some action is needed to drive home the point that Wong's repeated attempts at intervention in Ravi's proceedings is not the kind of conduct that the Law Society is willing to condone.