What did Shadrake really say?
I haven’t read the book. So, I think it would be really premature to judge on the contempt of court charges.
I have previously written about my views on criminal defamation. Looks like things are moving slowly on that front. But, it is really contempt of court where the action is at. As the law stands right now and as it has been interpreted by the Courts so far, contempt law would be based on English Common Law as it existed at the time that our Constitution was adopted.
If Shadrake avoided any allegation against the judiciary or if he refrained from imputing any wrongdoing or partiality on the part of the judiciary, the contempt charge may be difficult to make out. But, this is not entirely clear to me right now. It is entirely possible that the author might have taken a wild swing at the judiciary. That would be quite consistent with sensationalistic writing that some ‘investigative journalists’ are prone to and quite legitimately some of us would suspect that even Shadrake might have been guilty of. (Again, without reading the book I am really speculating here.)
For Shadrake to be on safe ground, the book must have referred to the cases in a factual reporting style and any allegation of unequal treatment under the law must have avoided allegations against the judiciary. Such a method of writing could have been accomplished without difficulty in relation the drug cases that Shadrake has reportedly addressed in his book. Based on Alex Au’s review of the book in his Yawning Bread blog, the following cases have been examined:
Vignes Mourthi case: The issue here appears to be evidence that was unavailable at the trial. Apparently, a key prosecution witness was involved in some impropriety and evidence of credibility of this witness was not available at the trial of Vigness Mourthi. I wouldn’t lay any blame on the judiciary. From my reading of the review by Alex Au, it doesn’t appear that Shadrake was blaming the judiciary.
Amara Tochi case: This case is more of an indictment of the reversal of the burden of proof in the Misuse of Drugs Act rather than an indictment of the judiciary. This is what opponents of the mandatory death penalty have been saying all along. The judge’s hands are tied. Once the presumption in the statute kicks in, it is virtually impossible for the Defendant to prove his position. Again, on the face of it, this case cannot possibly be an indictment of the judiciary.
Julia Bohl case: This is a trafficker against whom CNB appears to have had a good deal of evidence. However, in what is allegedly a deal between the German government and the Singapore government, the charge against Julia Bohl described a quantity of cannabis that was below the statutory presumption. Now, this is definitely a scandalous allegation. But, in any event, this is also not an allegation leveled against the judiciary. What has allegedly transpired could not be a stain on the judiciary.
I am not going into, and I should not go into (given the fact that I have not read the book), each of the other examples raised by Alex Au in his review of the book. A quick glance of each of the instances mentioned reveals that there may not have been any imputation against the judiciary to begin with in the book. This is something that I can ascertain for myself only if I read the book.
If the content of the book had the ‘inherent tendency’ to create prejudice, the contempt offence could be made out. The inherent tendency test is satisfied if a statement "conveys to an average reasonable reader allegations of bias, lack of impartiality, impropriety or any wrongdoing concerning a judge in the exercise of his judicial function." Whether any allegations were true is not an issue that can be raised as a defence. If Shadrake had merely dealt with individual cases by highlighting that different offenders were charged differently and this resulted in the inconsistent application of the death penalty, I don’t see how the contempt charge could be made out. It is, at most, an indictment of the law enforcement end of the system and in no way impugns the judiciary or its integrity.
Of course, the sneaking suspicion that I have is that somewhere along the way Shadrake might have made a sweeping statement that might have tied the judiciary to the inconsistency in the application of the death penalty. If he had done that, the contempt charge would be made out easily. This, I would not know until I have read the book.
I am left wondering…. What, exactly, did Shadrake say?
Showing posts with label judiciary. Show all posts
Showing posts with label judiciary. Show all posts
Thursday, August 05, 2010
Thursday, May 21, 2009
The Marxist Conspiracy of 1987 - revisiting a legal footnote
Five young activists have organized a gathering at Hong Lim Park to commemorate 21st May 1987. I’m glad to see that there are still many who recall the alleged ‘Marxist Conspiracy' of that era. I was 19 at that time and watched incredulously as a parade of tales emanated from the available media outlets.
There are so many things that we could recollect in relation to those days. Where were we? How did the news unfold? The general skepticism amongst many of us. I’d like to use this occasion to commemorate the day that our judiciary stood tall in the context of the rather limited legal role that it has in the review of executive action.
Chng Suan Tse v Minister for Home Affairs (1998) SLR 132
The case involved Operation Spectrum and the primary issue was over the court’s ability to review the Executive’s decision to detain under the Internal Security Act. It proved to be a landmark decision as the Court of Appeal chose to apply an objective test in assessing the discretion of the Executive instead of applying a purely subjective test as the courts had done in the past. Prior to this case, the position of the courts was to adopt a subjective approach as in the case of Lee Mau Seng v Minister for Home Affairs [1971] 2 MLJ 137.
What was the implication of the Chng Suan Tse decision? The Internal Security Act demands that the as a precondition to detention, the President be ‘satisfied’ as to certain matters. If the test was purely subjective as it was in Lee Mau Seng, there was little that a detainee could do to question the exercise of discretion. If the test was objective as propounded by the Court of Appeal in Chng Suan Tse, then it was possible for the court to assess at least whether objectively the President was ‘satisfied’.
The then Chief Justice, Wee Chong Jin stated in the judgment:
“In our view, the notion of a subjective or unfettered discretion is contrary to the rule of law. All power has legal limits and the rule of law demands that the courts should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary power. If therefore the executive in exercising its discretion under an Act of Parliament has exceeded the four corners within which Parliament has decided it can exercise its discretion, such an exercise of discretion would be ultra vires the Act and a court of law must be able to hold it to be so.”
“It must be clear therefore that the boundaries of the decisionmaker’s jurisdiction as conferred by an Act of Parliament is a question solely for the courts to decide. There is also, as counsel for the appellant has pointed out, no ouster clause in respect of s 8 or 10 of the ISA. Adopting the objective test in respect of ss 8 and 10 of the ISA would also be consistent with arts 9(2) and 93 of the Constitution. Further, it is, in our view, no answer to refer to accountability to Parliament as an alternative safeguard. As Lord Diplock put it in R v IRC, ex p National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617 at p 644:
It is not, in my view, a sufficient answer to say that judicial review of the actions of officers or departments of central government is unnecessary because they are accountable to Parliament for the way in which they carry out their functions. They are accountable to Parliament for what they do so far as regards efficiency and policy, and of that Parliament is the only judge; they are responsible to a court of justice for the lawfulness of what they do, and of that the court is the only judge
The Court went on to rule that:
"the President’s satisfaction under s 8 of the ISA and the minister’s satisfaction under s 10 of the ISA are both reviewable by a court of law as:
(1) the subjective test adopted in Karam Singh [1969] 2 MLJ 129 and its progeny can no longer be supported and the objective test is applicable upon a judicial review of the exercise of these discretions; and
(2) although a court will not question the executive’s decision as to what national security requires, the court can examine whether the executive’s decision was in fact based on national security considerations; similarly, although the court will not question whether detention was necessary for the purpose specified in s 8(1), the courts can examine whether the matters relied on by the executive fall within the scope of those specified purposes"
Of course, the story did not end there. Parliament duly amended the Internal Security Act in 1989 to nullify the effect of this case in relation to detentions under the ISA. By virtue of s.8B, the law on judicial review with regard to the ISA detentions was brought back to the position in 1971 and by virtue of s.8D the legislative change was to have effect in relation to any proceedings whether commenced before or after the amendment.
Law applicable to judicial review.
8B. —(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), the law governing the judicial review of any decision made or act done in pursuance of any power conferred upon the President or the Minister by the provisions of this Act shall be the same as was applicable and declared in Singapore on the 13th day of July 1971; and no part of the law before, on or after that date of any other country in the Commonwealth relating to judicial review shall apply.
(2) There shall be no judicial review in any court of any act done or decision made by the President or the Minister under the provisions of this Act save in regard to any question relating to compliance with any procedural requirement of this Act governing such act or decision.
- Act 2/89 wef 30.1.89.
Commencement provision.8D. Sections 8A and 8B shall apply to any proceedings instituted by way of judicial review of any decision made or act done under the provisions of this Act, whether such proceedings have been instituted before or after the commencement of the Internal Security (Amendment) Act 1989.
- Act 2/89wef30.1.89.
Friday, July 11, 2008
Of word games and human rights, democracy, rule of law and all that jazz
The International Bar Association has released a report entitled, ‘Prosperity versus Individual Rights? Human Rights, Democracy and the rule of law in Singapore.’ The Ministry of Law has responded swiftly to the report. Let’s see what the Ministry has to say.
From para 2 of MinLaw’s response:“2. From a quick perusal of the Executive Summary, we note that IBAHRI has not taken into account our comments on their draft report, sent on 9 April 2008. We release a copy of our comments previously given to the Chairman of the IBAHRI on the draft report, for your reference.”
It is MinLaw’s assertion that IBAHRI had not taken into account their comments. This is a reference to a letter dated 9 April 2008 from Mark Jayaratnam, Deputy Director of the Legal Policy Division of the Ministry of Law. I went through the IBAHRI report and for good measure I used the ‘search’ tool available for pdf files. Mark Jayaratnam’s letter is referenced by the report 19 times. They have ‘taken into account’ the comments. Although, it is clear that it does not necessarily agree with the comments, IBAHRI has, where appropriate, quoted from the letter to illustrate the Singapore Government’s viewpoint.
The moral of the story… don’t jump to conclusions based on a quick perusal of the Executive Summary. Surely, the Executive Summary is not going to exhibit the government’s comments. I suspect that when MinLaw asserts that IBAHRI did not take into account the comments, what they really had in the mind was that IBAHRI did not agree with their comments. One can take into account an opposing thesis and then disagree. The fact that one disagrees does not mean that one has not taken into account the opposing thesis.
From para 3 of MinLaw’s response:
“3. The IBAHRI Report questions the independence of the Singapore Judiciary. This is contradicted by Mr Fernando Pombo, President of the IBA, who stated in his opening speech at the IBA Conference in Singapore last October that lawyers the world over were coming to Singapore because:
"this country has an outstanding legal profession, an outstanding judiciary, an outstanding academical world in relation to the law".”
It is quite clear from the IBAHRI Report that the allegations directed at the issue of the independence of the judiciary are muted and qualified. IBAHRI does not go all out to claim that the judiciary is not independent. They have acknowledged the high standards maintained by the judiciary and the high standards within our legal system. But, they have sought to address the nagging doubt that is raised by some of the ‘political’ cases that have appeared before the courts. The criticism is measured and I believe it is not inconsistent with the IBA President’s comments at the IBA Conference last year.
“The judiciary in Singapore has a good international reputation for the integrity of their judgments when adjudicating commercial cases that do not involve the interests of PAP members or their associates. However, in cases involving PAP litigants or PAP interests, there are concerns about an actual or apparent lack of impartiality and/or independence, which casts doubt on the decisions made in such cases. Although this may not go so far as claimed by some non-governmental organisations, which allege that the judiciary is entirely controlled by the will of the executive, there are sufficient reasons to worry about the influence of the executive over judicial decision making. Regardless of any actual interference, the reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient. In addition, it appears that some of the objective characteristics of judicial independence, including security of tenure, separation from the executive branch and administrative independence may be absent from the Singapore judicial system.”
IBAHRI’s comments and their findings do not assert an actual executive interference in judicial affairs. In fact, they are suggesting that there is room for improvement. After all, justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done.
From Para 4 of MinLaw’s response:
“4. Other independent observers agree. The Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC), which rates Asian countries on their business and legal environments, regularly rates the Singapore judiciary highly. PERC's Asian Intelligence Report 2006 explained that this was because the Singapore judiciary demonstrated three essential elements of judicial independence. First, the courts and individual judges within the system are publicly perceived to be impartial in their decisions. Second, judicial decisions are accepted by contesting parties and the larger public. Third, judges are perceived to be free from undue interference from other branches of government. The IBAHRI Report failed to acknowledge these facts.”
IBAHRI does refer to the PERC Asian Intelligence Report of 2006. In the section D of the Report under the heading ‘Singapore’s International Rankings’, IBAHRI has outline a number of rankings that rate Singapore very highly and some that rank Singapore poorly. Specifically in relation to the judiciary, this is what they say:
“In the judicial and legal system rankings, Singapore has also performed well in international assessments. In Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2006, which measures the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians, Singapore ranked fifth in the word. Similarly, in an Asian-only based report, the Political & Economic Risk Consultancy’s Asian Intelligence Report 2006, strong commendation of Singapore’s judicial system was made, stating: ‘Within Asia, Hong Kong and Singapore are the only two systems with judiciaries that rate on a par with those in developed Western societies…’
So, the bone of contention for MinLaw is that IBAHRI did not acknowledge all of the accolades given by PERC. Clearly, if IBAHRI intended to carry out an independent study, it would take into account the findings of multiple sources and draw its own conclusions. We can’t expect IBAHRI to rubber stamp PERC’s findings. All that this indicates is that there is a variety of opinion out there about our judiciary. In any event, the point that IBAHRI seems to make is not so much that our judiciary is not independent but rather that there is a perception of lack of independence.
From Para 5 of MinLaw’s response5. The IBAHRI Report did acknowledge that "Singapore has a good international reputation for the integrity of their judgments when adjudicating commercial cases", but it alleged that for cases that involve "the interests of PAP members or their associates", there were "concerns about an actual or apparent lack of impartiality and/or independence". Instead of substantiating this grave allegation with evidence, the Report argued that "regardless of any actual interference, the reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient". This is a feeble justification.
Oh my God! Feeble justification. A very important principle of procedural justice is a ‘feeble justification’. Justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done. This principle is basic. The point is best illustrated through using the process of adjudication. If I judge a civil dispute involving my son as the Plaintiff and some other person as the Defendant, I might still be able to do the honourable thing and adjudicate impartially. I might assure the defendant that I will adjudicate based on the law and the evidence before me and that the Plaintiff will be treated as just any other person. It is not inconceivable that a true man of conscience with a deep sense of justice would be able to perform this separation of reason and emotion.
There is a story about a Chola king in Tamil Nadu that has passed into legend and it is eulogised in classical Tamil literature. Manu-needi Cholan had a son who killed a calf by riding his chariot over it. The king had a petition-bell outside the palace. Any person who felt aggrieved may ring the bell and seek justice. The mother of the calf was ringing the bell violently. The king eventually discovered through his aides the full story pertaining to the killing of the calf. He then ordered that his son be punished for the crime that he committed.
This story is always presented as an indication of how an honourable king would behave when adjudicating a dispute. The unstated fact is that impartiality in adjudication is not a norm and is usually an exception. Surely the norm is that a king would have difficulties in being impartial when his own son is involved. So, it is important that the king does not place himself in a position of a judge when his own son is the object of the complaint. However, that old Tamil story seeks to instill the value of impartiality within the ruler rather than to insist that a system of impartiality be created to distance the king from the adjudicative process so that we can guard against the human frailty (which is a norm rather than an exception).
In English law, which we have inherited, there is a deep sense of impartiality in decision-making that has been implanted within civil and criminal proceedings. In fact, instead of taking chances with the ability of fallible human beings in performing the mental gymnastics of separating their personal emotions (fear, favour, vested interests) from the rational processes, there is a principle of natural justice that no man shall be a judge in his own cause. If a judge is faced with a Plaintiff or a Defendant in a case and there is a personal financial or non-financial interest that the judge has in the case, he must not hear the case. The principle extends beyond actual bias and deals with apparent bias as well. Our own courts have in many cases held the principle to be of application in Singapore. Of course, this is a principle that is utilised in the course of judicial proceedings. So, a judgment can be quashed not only where actual bias is proven but also on the basis of apparent bias.
Therefore, in the context of judicial impartiality and/or independence, there is no reason why the standard of apparent lack of impartiality and/or independence should not be applied.
IBAHRI’s assertion is as follows:
“However, in cases involving PAP litigants or PAP interests, there are concerns about an actual or apparent lack of impartiality and/or independence, which casts doubt on the decisions made in such cases. Although this may not go so far as claimed by some non-governmental organisations, which allege that the judiciary is entirely controlled by the will of the executive, there are sufficient reasons to worry about the influence of the executive over judicial decision making. Regardless of any actual interference, the reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient.”
Note that the report does not state that there is no impartiality or independence. It states that there are ‘concerns’ about the ‘actual’ ‘or’ ‘apparent’ lack of impartiality and/or independence. In fact, they were at pains to point out that they were breaking ranks with other NGOs that go overboard in criticising the judiciary in Singapore.
This, however, is the allegedly ‘feeble’ point that they are trying to make: “regardless of any actual interference, the reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient.”
The point is that it is not enough for a government to assert that there is no interference. Efforts must be made to ensure that the system is not capable of being abused. Efforts must be made to ensure that the system does not allow for the possibility of interference. Efforts must be made to ensure that there can be no reasonable perception of interference. In its report, IBAHRI uses the examples of Judge Michael Khoo, the trend in defamation suits and the Jeyaratnam case that went up to the Privy Council to illustrate the perception of interference. It is clear from the report that there is no actual evidence of interference.
When IBAHRI states that reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient, they mean that a modern state such as Singapore should strive for a higher governance standard. We can no longer be judged like a third world country. We have first world standards in so many aspects of our life. Is there anything wrong in seeking to have a system of governance that excludes the possibility of executive interference in the judiciary?
From para 6 of MinLaw’s response
6. The cases brought by PAP members usually relate to scurrilous and completely untrue allegations of corruption made against them. Providing clean and efficient governance is a longstanding cornerstone of the PAP Government's policy. Thus defamatory allegations cannot be allowed to rest. The accuser has to prove his allegations. The decisions of the Courts in these cases are matters of public record, and can be analysed. Anyone questioning these verdicts should try to do so by examining these decisions properly, rather than making vague unsubstantiated allegations. What the western media continually criticise is that Singapore does not adopt Western, i.e. American, defamation laws that give the media freedom to report libellous untruths without liability to pay damages. It is also absurd to suggest that honourable and upright judges in commercial cases become compliant and dishonourable when dealing with defamation cases involving government ministers.
I will be fair to our judiciary in those defamation suits. The decisions have remained within the rational limits of the English law of defamation that we have inherited. Using defamation suits alone as a basis for alleging the perception of lack of judicial independence would be insufficient. IBAHRI does not rely on the defamation suits alone. In fact in relation to defamation suits, the bone of contention appears to be that statistically, PAP litigants have received much higher damages compared to non-PAP litigants. Incidentally, the IBAHRI statistics are a bit outdated. They end at 1999. IBAHRI also takes issue with the Summary Judgment procedure that is available under our Rules of Court for defamation suits. When a matter is disposed via Summary Judgment, the matter is not heard in open court. In suits involving politicians, this can run counter to the need for the public to view the proceedings so that they can form their own opinion and so that no allegations of executive interference can be made in the judicial process. It is from this perspective that IBAHRI have made their observations vis a vis he defamation suits.
Para 7 and para 8 of MinLaw’s response deserves a separate comment which I will attempt to do in a separate blog.
From para 2 of MinLaw’s response:“2. From a quick perusal of the Executive Summary, we note that IBAHRI has not taken into account our comments on their draft report, sent on 9 April 2008. We release a copy of our comments previously given to the Chairman of the IBAHRI on the draft report, for your reference.”
It is MinLaw’s assertion that IBAHRI had not taken into account their comments. This is a reference to a letter dated 9 April 2008 from Mark Jayaratnam, Deputy Director of the Legal Policy Division of the Ministry of Law. I went through the IBAHRI report and for good measure I used the ‘search’ tool available for pdf files. Mark Jayaratnam’s letter is referenced by the report 19 times. They have ‘taken into account’ the comments. Although, it is clear that it does not necessarily agree with the comments, IBAHRI has, where appropriate, quoted from the letter to illustrate the Singapore Government’s viewpoint.
The moral of the story… don’t jump to conclusions based on a quick perusal of the Executive Summary. Surely, the Executive Summary is not going to exhibit the government’s comments. I suspect that when MinLaw asserts that IBAHRI did not take into account the comments, what they really had in the mind was that IBAHRI did not agree with their comments. One can take into account an opposing thesis and then disagree. The fact that one disagrees does not mean that one has not taken into account the opposing thesis.
From para 3 of MinLaw’s response:
“3. The IBAHRI Report questions the independence of the Singapore Judiciary. This is contradicted by Mr Fernando Pombo, President of the IBA, who stated in his opening speech at the IBA Conference in Singapore last October that lawyers the world over were coming to Singapore because:
"this country has an outstanding legal profession, an outstanding judiciary, an outstanding academical world in relation to the law".”
It is quite clear from the IBAHRI Report that the allegations directed at the issue of the independence of the judiciary are muted and qualified. IBAHRI does not go all out to claim that the judiciary is not independent. They have acknowledged the high standards maintained by the judiciary and the high standards within our legal system. But, they have sought to address the nagging doubt that is raised by some of the ‘political’ cases that have appeared before the courts. The criticism is measured and I believe it is not inconsistent with the IBA President’s comments at the IBA Conference last year.
“The judiciary in Singapore has a good international reputation for the integrity of their judgments when adjudicating commercial cases that do not involve the interests of PAP members or their associates. However, in cases involving PAP litigants or PAP interests, there are concerns about an actual or apparent lack of impartiality and/or independence, which casts doubt on the decisions made in such cases. Although this may not go so far as claimed by some non-governmental organisations, which allege that the judiciary is entirely controlled by the will of the executive, there are sufficient reasons to worry about the influence of the executive over judicial decision making. Regardless of any actual interference, the reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient. In addition, it appears that some of the objective characteristics of judicial independence, including security of tenure, separation from the executive branch and administrative independence may be absent from the Singapore judicial system.”
IBAHRI’s comments and their findings do not assert an actual executive interference in judicial affairs. In fact, they are suggesting that there is room for improvement. After all, justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done.
From Para 4 of MinLaw’s response:
“4. Other independent observers agree. The Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC), which rates Asian countries on their business and legal environments, regularly rates the Singapore judiciary highly. PERC's Asian Intelligence Report 2006 explained that this was because the Singapore judiciary demonstrated three essential elements of judicial independence. First, the courts and individual judges within the system are publicly perceived to be impartial in their decisions. Second, judicial decisions are accepted by contesting parties and the larger public. Third, judges are perceived to be free from undue interference from other branches of government. The IBAHRI Report failed to acknowledge these facts.”
IBAHRI does refer to the PERC Asian Intelligence Report of 2006. In the section D of the Report under the heading ‘Singapore’s International Rankings’, IBAHRI has outline a number of rankings that rate Singapore very highly and some that rank Singapore poorly. Specifically in relation to the judiciary, this is what they say:
“In the judicial and legal system rankings, Singapore has also performed well in international assessments. In Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2006, which measures the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians, Singapore ranked fifth in the word. Similarly, in an Asian-only based report, the Political & Economic Risk Consultancy’s Asian Intelligence Report 2006, strong commendation of Singapore’s judicial system was made, stating: ‘Within Asia, Hong Kong and Singapore are the only two systems with judiciaries that rate on a par with those in developed Western societies…’
So, the bone of contention for MinLaw is that IBAHRI did not acknowledge all of the accolades given by PERC. Clearly, if IBAHRI intended to carry out an independent study, it would take into account the findings of multiple sources and draw its own conclusions. We can’t expect IBAHRI to rubber stamp PERC’s findings. All that this indicates is that there is a variety of opinion out there about our judiciary. In any event, the point that IBAHRI seems to make is not so much that our judiciary is not independent but rather that there is a perception of lack of independence.
From Para 5 of MinLaw’s response5. The IBAHRI Report did acknowledge that "Singapore has a good international reputation for the integrity of their judgments when adjudicating commercial cases", but it alleged that for cases that involve "the interests of PAP members or their associates", there were "concerns about an actual or apparent lack of impartiality and/or independence". Instead of substantiating this grave allegation with evidence, the Report argued that "regardless of any actual interference, the reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient". This is a feeble justification.
Oh my God! Feeble justification. A very important principle of procedural justice is a ‘feeble justification’. Justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done. This principle is basic. The point is best illustrated through using the process of adjudication. If I judge a civil dispute involving my son as the Plaintiff and some other person as the Defendant, I might still be able to do the honourable thing and adjudicate impartially. I might assure the defendant that I will adjudicate based on the law and the evidence before me and that the Plaintiff will be treated as just any other person. It is not inconceivable that a true man of conscience with a deep sense of justice would be able to perform this separation of reason and emotion.
There is a story about a Chola king in Tamil Nadu that has passed into legend and it is eulogised in classical Tamil literature. Manu-needi Cholan had a son who killed a calf by riding his chariot over it. The king had a petition-bell outside the palace. Any person who felt aggrieved may ring the bell and seek justice. The mother of the calf was ringing the bell violently. The king eventually discovered through his aides the full story pertaining to the killing of the calf. He then ordered that his son be punished for the crime that he committed.
This story is always presented as an indication of how an honourable king would behave when adjudicating a dispute. The unstated fact is that impartiality in adjudication is not a norm and is usually an exception. Surely the norm is that a king would have difficulties in being impartial when his own son is involved. So, it is important that the king does not place himself in a position of a judge when his own son is the object of the complaint. However, that old Tamil story seeks to instill the value of impartiality within the ruler rather than to insist that a system of impartiality be created to distance the king from the adjudicative process so that we can guard against the human frailty (which is a norm rather than an exception).
In English law, which we have inherited, there is a deep sense of impartiality in decision-making that has been implanted within civil and criminal proceedings. In fact, instead of taking chances with the ability of fallible human beings in performing the mental gymnastics of separating their personal emotions (fear, favour, vested interests) from the rational processes, there is a principle of natural justice that no man shall be a judge in his own cause. If a judge is faced with a Plaintiff or a Defendant in a case and there is a personal financial or non-financial interest that the judge has in the case, he must not hear the case. The principle extends beyond actual bias and deals with apparent bias as well. Our own courts have in many cases held the principle to be of application in Singapore. Of course, this is a principle that is utilised in the course of judicial proceedings. So, a judgment can be quashed not only where actual bias is proven but also on the basis of apparent bias.
Therefore, in the context of judicial impartiality and/or independence, there is no reason why the standard of apparent lack of impartiality and/or independence should not be applied.
IBAHRI’s assertion is as follows:
“However, in cases involving PAP litigants or PAP interests, there are concerns about an actual or apparent lack of impartiality and/or independence, which casts doubt on the decisions made in such cases. Although this may not go so far as claimed by some non-governmental organisations, which allege that the judiciary is entirely controlled by the will of the executive, there are sufficient reasons to worry about the influence of the executive over judicial decision making. Regardless of any actual interference, the reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient.”
Note that the report does not state that there is no impartiality or independence. It states that there are ‘concerns’ about the ‘actual’ ‘or’ ‘apparent’ lack of impartiality and/or independence. In fact, they were at pains to point out that they were breaking ranks with other NGOs that go overboard in criticising the judiciary in Singapore.
This, however, is the allegedly ‘feeble’ point that they are trying to make: “regardless of any actual interference, the reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient.”
The point is that it is not enough for a government to assert that there is no interference. Efforts must be made to ensure that the system is not capable of being abused. Efforts must be made to ensure that the system does not allow for the possibility of interference. Efforts must be made to ensure that there can be no reasonable perception of interference. In its report, IBAHRI uses the examples of Judge Michael Khoo, the trend in defamation suits and the Jeyaratnam case that went up to the Privy Council to illustrate the perception of interference. It is clear from the report that there is no actual evidence of interference.
When IBAHRI states that reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient, they mean that a modern state such as Singapore should strive for a higher governance standard. We can no longer be judged like a third world country. We have first world standards in so many aspects of our life. Is there anything wrong in seeking to have a system of governance that excludes the possibility of executive interference in the judiciary?
From para 6 of MinLaw’s response
6. The cases brought by PAP members usually relate to scurrilous and completely untrue allegations of corruption made against them. Providing clean and efficient governance is a longstanding cornerstone of the PAP Government's policy. Thus defamatory allegations cannot be allowed to rest. The accuser has to prove his allegations. The decisions of the Courts in these cases are matters of public record, and can be analysed. Anyone questioning these verdicts should try to do so by examining these decisions properly, rather than making vague unsubstantiated allegations. What the western media continually criticise is that Singapore does not adopt Western, i.e. American, defamation laws that give the media freedom to report libellous untruths without liability to pay damages. It is also absurd to suggest that honourable and upright judges in commercial cases become compliant and dishonourable when dealing with defamation cases involving government ministers.
I will be fair to our judiciary in those defamation suits. The decisions have remained within the rational limits of the English law of defamation that we have inherited. Using defamation suits alone as a basis for alleging the perception of lack of judicial independence would be insufficient. IBAHRI does not rely on the defamation suits alone. In fact in relation to defamation suits, the bone of contention appears to be that statistically, PAP litigants have received much higher damages compared to non-PAP litigants. Incidentally, the IBAHRI statistics are a bit outdated. They end at 1999. IBAHRI also takes issue with the Summary Judgment procedure that is available under our Rules of Court for defamation suits. When a matter is disposed via Summary Judgment, the matter is not heard in open court. In suits involving politicians, this can run counter to the need for the public to view the proceedings so that they can form their own opinion and so that no allegations of executive interference can be made in the judicial process. It is from this perspective that IBAHRI have made their observations vis a vis he defamation suits.
Para 7 and para 8 of MinLaw’s response deserves a separate comment which I will attempt to do in a separate blog.
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