The Burmese government has released 651 prisoners, amongst whom are political prisoners detained since 1988.
Although this release is to be welcomed, it has to be remembered that there are probably many more political prisoners that continue to languish in jail. Estimates based on disappearances of activists and official reports of past detentions place the number of possible detainees at between 1000 to 1500. The Association of Political Prisoners in Burma has estimated that more than 1500 prisoners have been detained for political reasons.
This release of prisoners is a step in the right direction. Hopefully, the Burmese government will continue down the road to democracy by releasing all of its political prisoners.
Meanwhile, I read something that was said by the US President that I couldn't help but be amused about. He was referring to a telephone conversation that he had with Aung San Suu Kyi when he was in Indonesia 2 months ago:
"In Indonesia, I spoke about the flickers of progress that were emerging in Burma. Today, that light burns a bit brighter, as prisoners are reunited with their families and people can see a democratic path forward,"
I couldn't help but think to myself... and one day that light will burn even brighter and reach America's backyard and set the men at Guantanamo free (or at least let them have their day in a court of law). The hypocrisy of Obama is mind-boggling and downright ugly. What am I talking about? This is, after all, the Nobel Peace Prize winner that bombs babies and buries them under the banner of collateral damage.
Friday, January 13, 2012
Wednesday, January 11, 2012
Death by prosecutorial discretion
The rather uncomfortable fact surrounding the mandatory death penalty for drug trafficking in Singapore is the fact that the presumption of trafficking operates on the basis of the possession of a specified quantity of a prohibited drug. Prosecution does not prove that you are a trafficker. Prosecution proves that you are in possession of a specified quantity of drugs. The law artificially designates you are a trafficker and you stand to be convicted if you cannot prove otherwise.
Firstly, the reversal of the burden of proof (i.e. making the Defendant prove certain facts instead of the Prosecution) on its own raises questions of the right of a private citizen to a fair trial. There may be justifiable reasons for such reversals in limited situations. I am not opposed to reversals of the burden of proof on all occasions. But, the use of this evidential technique in drug trafficking cases, where the failure of the defendant to discharge his burden places him on death row, cannot be described as anything other than a form of injustice. That injustice is, of course, firmly a part of our Misuse of Drugs Act.
Complicating this injustice enshrined in our statute books is the application of prosecutorial discretion. Let me make this clear. I am not opposed to the exercise of discretion by the prosecution. It is a necessary feature of every mature legal system that discretion be given to prosecuting bodies to decide on whether to prosecute at all or to prosecute for any number of given offences. It is also not uncommon that if a person had stolen a mobile phone and a wallet, he is then charged only for the theft of the mobile phone. Such exercise of prosecutorial discretion is not considered as odd, exceptional or an abuse of process. In fact, it is a necessary feature of the proper administration of justice that a prosecutor should be able to exercise discretion.
But, the difference between charging a person for the theft of a mobile phone and a wallet as opposed to charging him for the theft of a mobile phone alone is not substantial. On the other hand, the difference of 0.01g of cocaine in a charge sheet for a drug trafficking offence is as dramatic as either having a noose around your neck or being granted what is effectively a 'prosecutorial pardon'.
This stark difference was played out in the case of Ramalingam Ravinthran. This was a case where his co-accused was charged with trafficking in 499.99g of cannabis and 999.99g of cannabis mixture conveniently shy of the mandatory death penalty by 0.01g. That is just decimal points away from death. Ramalingam himself was charged for the trafficking of quantities that triggered the death penalty. In the end, the facts were such that the charges arose from a single bag containing 5,560.1g of cannabis and 2,078.3g of cannabis mixture. Not only did the prosecution artificially slice the contents of the bag by charging the defendants in the way it did, it also placed one man on death row whilst granting the other his life.
The Court of Appeal has delivered its verdict in the Ramalingam case. Based on the Straits Times report it is not entirely clear as to what was the precise ambit of the decision. It is reported: "IT IS not unlawful for the Attorney-General to artificially reduce the amount of drugs specified in a trafficker's charges, to differentiate from those of his accomplice. Nor is it unconstitutional."
On the other hand, it also reported: "Still, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is subject to legal limits - the A-G cannot act arbitrarily. This means the A-G must ensure like cases are treated alike. And in cases where several offenders are involved, the A-G must not unlawfully discriminate against an offender."
It is difficult to surmise from the news report itself as to the precise position of the Court. I would have to read the 48 page judgment itself to ascertain the legal position.
I gather roughly from the report that the court has gone for the position that the power of the prosecution to exercise discretion is lawful and constitutional. However, the manner in which such discretion is exercised may be called into question. If that is indeed the position, the decision should be welcomed. (I say this fully aware of the fact that it provides no comfort to either Ramalingam or his family.) It prevents arbitrary decision making on the part of the prosecution and forces prosecuting bodies to consider carefully their reasons before differentiating between two defendants in the same case or for that matter (arguably) two defendants in entirely separate cases where the circumstances might be similar.
I shall read the judgment first before commenting further on this case.
Firstly, the reversal of the burden of proof (i.e. making the Defendant prove certain facts instead of the Prosecution) on its own raises questions of the right of a private citizen to a fair trial. There may be justifiable reasons for such reversals in limited situations. I am not opposed to reversals of the burden of proof on all occasions. But, the use of this evidential technique in drug trafficking cases, where the failure of the defendant to discharge his burden places him on death row, cannot be described as anything other than a form of injustice. That injustice is, of course, firmly a part of our Misuse of Drugs Act.
Complicating this injustice enshrined in our statute books is the application of prosecutorial discretion. Let me make this clear. I am not opposed to the exercise of discretion by the prosecution. It is a necessary feature of every mature legal system that discretion be given to prosecuting bodies to decide on whether to prosecute at all or to prosecute for any number of given offences. It is also not uncommon that if a person had stolen a mobile phone and a wallet, he is then charged only for the theft of the mobile phone. Such exercise of prosecutorial discretion is not considered as odd, exceptional or an abuse of process. In fact, it is a necessary feature of the proper administration of justice that a prosecutor should be able to exercise discretion.
But, the difference between charging a person for the theft of a mobile phone and a wallet as opposed to charging him for the theft of a mobile phone alone is not substantial. On the other hand, the difference of 0.01g of cocaine in a charge sheet for a drug trafficking offence is as dramatic as either having a noose around your neck or being granted what is effectively a 'prosecutorial pardon'.
This stark difference was played out in the case of Ramalingam Ravinthran. This was a case where his co-accused was charged with trafficking in 499.99g of cannabis and 999.99g of cannabis mixture conveniently shy of the mandatory death penalty by 0.01g. That is just decimal points away from death. Ramalingam himself was charged for the trafficking of quantities that triggered the death penalty. In the end, the facts were such that the charges arose from a single bag containing 5,560.1g of cannabis and 2,078.3g of cannabis mixture. Not only did the prosecution artificially slice the contents of the bag by charging the defendants in the way it did, it also placed one man on death row whilst granting the other his life.
The Court of Appeal has delivered its verdict in the Ramalingam case. Based on the Straits Times report it is not entirely clear as to what was the precise ambit of the decision. It is reported: "IT IS not unlawful for the Attorney-General to artificially reduce the amount of drugs specified in a trafficker's charges, to differentiate from those of his accomplice. Nor is it unconstitutional."
On the other hand, it also reported: "Still, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is subject to legal limits - the A-G cannot act arbitrarily. This means the A-G must ensure like cases are treated alike. And in cases where several offenders are involved, the A-G must not unlawfully discriminate against an offender."
It is difficult to surmise from the news report itself as to the precise position of the Court. I would have to read the 48 page judgment itself to ascertain the legal position.
I gather roughly from the report that the court has gone for the position that the power of the prosecution to exercise discretion is lawful and constitutional. However, the manner in which such discretion is exercised may be called into question. If that is indeed the position, the decision should be welcomed. (I say this fully aware of the fact that it provides no comfort to either Ramalingam or his family.) It prevents arbitrary decision making on the part of the prosecution and forces prosecuting bodies to consider carefully their reasons before differentiating between two defendants in the same case or for that matter (arguably) two defendants in entirely separate cases where the circumstances might be similar.
I shall read the judgment first before commenting further on this case.
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