The rather uncomfortable fact surrounding the mandatory death penalty for drug trafficking in Singapore is the fact that the presumption of trafficking operates on the basis of the possession of a specified quantity of a prohibited drug. Prosecution does not prove that you are a trafficker. Prosecution proves that you are in possession of a specified quantity of drugs. The law artificially designates you are a trafficker and you stand to be convicted if you cannot prove otherwise.
Firstly, the reversal of the burden of proof (i.e. making the Defendant prove certain facts instead of the Prosecution) on its own raises questions of the right of a private citizen to a fair trial. There may be justifiable reasons for such reversals in limited situations. I am not opposed to reversals of the burden of proof on all occasions. But, the use of this evidential technique in drug trafficking cases, where the failure of the defendant to discharge his burden places him on death row, cannot be described as anything other than a form of injustice. That injustice is, of course, firmly a part of our Misuse of Drugs Act.
Complicating this injustice enshrined in our statute books is the application of prosecutorial discretion. Let me make this clear. I am not opposed to the exercise of discretion by the prosecution. It is a necessary feature of every mature legal system that discretion be given to prosecuting bodies to decide on whether to prosecute at all or to prosecute for any number of given offences. It is also not uncommon that if a person had stolen a mobile phone and a wallet, he is then charged only for the theft of the mobile phone. Such exercise of prosecutorial discretion is not considered as odd, exceptional or an abuse of process. In fact, it is a necessary feature of the proper administration of justice that a prosecutor should be able to exercise discretion.
But, the difference between charging a person for the theft of a mobile phone and a wallet as opposed to charging him for the theft of a mobile phone alone is not substantial. On the other hand, the difference of 0.01g of cocaine in a charge sheet for a drug trafficking offence is as dramatic as either having a noose around your neck or being granted what is effectively a 'prosecutorial pardon'.
This stark difference was played out in the case of Ramalingam Ravinthran. This was a case where his co-accused was charged with trafficking in 499.99g of cannabis and 999.99g of cannabis mixture conveniently shy of the mandatory death penalty by 0.01g. That is just decimal points away from death. Ramalingam himself was charged for the trafficking of quantities that triggered the death penalty. In the end, the facts were such that the charges arose from a single bag containing 5,560.1g of cannabis and 2,078.3g of cannabis mixture. Not only did the prosecution artificially slice the contents of the bag by charging the defendants in the way it did, it also placed one man on death row whilst granting the other his life.
The Court of Appeal has delivered its verdict in the Ramalingam case. Based on the Straits Times report it is not entirely clear as to what was the precise ambit of the decision. It is reported: "IT IS not unlawful for the Attorney-General to artificially reduce the amount of drugs specified in a trafficker's charges, to differentiate from those of his accomplice. Nor is it unconstitutional."
On the other hand, it also reported: "Still, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is subject to legal limits - the A-G cannot act arbitrarily. This means the A-G must ensure like cases are treated alike. And in cases where several offenders are involved, the A-G must not unlawfully discriminate against an offender."
It is difficult to surmise from the news report itself as to the precise position of the Court. I would have to read the 48 page judgment itself to ascertain the legal position.
I gather roughly from the report that the court has gone for the position that the power of the prosecution to exercise discretion is lawful and constitutional. However, the manner in which such discretion is exercised may be called into question. If that is indeed the position, the decision should be welcomed. (I say this fully aware of the fact that it provides no comfort to either Ramalingam or his family.) It prevents arbitrary decision making on the part of the prosecution and forces prosecuting bodies to consider carefully their reasons before differentiating between two defendants in the same case or for that matter (arguably) two defendants in entirely separate cases where the circumstances might be similar.
I shall read the judgment first before commenting further on this case.
Showing posts with label Rule of law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rule of law. Show all posts
Wednesday, January 11, 2012
Tuesday, July 07, 2009
Section 377A is a law, a decorative piece or a potential political tool?
The High Court in Delhi has interpreted s.377 of the Indian Penal Code as not criminalising consensual homosexual relations between adults for to criminalise such conduct would be unconstitutional. To put things in perspective, Singapore had already repealed s.377 in 2007. However, we do have s.377A:
What is our government's response to the Indian Court's decision?
“We have the law. We say it won’t be enforced. Is it totally clear? We, sometimes in these things, have to accept a bit of messiness.” - Mr K. Shanmugam, Minister of Law, 2nd Minister of Home Affairs.
Boy do I have a problem with that statement! The Law Minister is making a case for messiness in the law. Is it acceptable to have some messiness in the law?
The hallmark of the rule of law is the control of wide or discretionary power. Whenever the state is given power over citizens, that power must be regulated by law. Where the state has discretion in the use of power, that discretion must be regulated by law. Thus, in many areas of the exercise of authority, the Executive is required to operate within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution and by Acts of Parliament. Where the Executive is permitted discretion in the application of particular policies, our system allows for judicial review of such discretion. In this way, we seek to control abuse of power by subjecting all power to law.
We have a slightly different problem when there is a law that criminalises a certain conduct. The state is now authorised to prosecute an individual for the commission of an offence as deemed by that law. Where such authority exists, the expectation of the citizenry is that the law be applied consistently and efficiently. With regard to much of our criminal laws we have earned the reputation of consistent and efficient application. What then becomes of a law that is not enforced? Does it cease to be law by its disuse? Does it gradually fail to have any legal status by the very fact of its long term non-application? The answer is an emphatic No! A law is a law so long as it fulfils the criteria of validity within a legal system. If it is found in a statute, by the requirements of legal validity in Singapore, we would regard it as a law. This is without regard to whether it has become comatose.
So, what is the problem if there is a law that criminalises a certain conduct and that law has gone into a state of disuse but is nevertheless considered to be a law? It is possible for someone to assert from a practical standpoint: ‘Look. That is the law. We haven’t been enforcing it right? We won’t enforce it in the future. So, there is nothing to worry about. The law is a bit untidy. But, that is just going to be an abstract issue of academic importance. You won’t get charged for this offence. We are sincere about it.’ It is easy to be enticed by this supposed distinction between the practical and the theoretical.
I firmly believe that there is a practical reason for removing a law that the Executive and the Legislature regard as one that should not be enforced. If a law that the state has chosen not to enforce is retained, it becomes a tool in the hands of a future Executive that seeks to abuse power. In relation to s.377A of the Penal Code this is the problem. It is clear from statements made by some of our ministers as well as some Parliamentarians that there is no collective interest on the part of our State to enforce s.377A. They have made repeated assurances that they would not enforce the provision. This includes the latest assurance by the Law Minister: “We have the law. We say it will not be enforced. Is it totally clear?” To be fair, I have no reason to doubt Mr K Shanmugam’s sincerity when he asserted that. In fact, there appears to be a certain impatience in the phraseology revealing the sincerity that the Minister has with regard to the non-enforcement of s.377A. I do not take issue with the sincerity of our government on this issue. I do believe that they would not enforce s.377A against consenting adults carrying out the act in private. Whilst I do not believe s.377A would be enforced, I do believe that it exists as a powerful tool if the state is minded to abuse power. We are all familiar with Anwar Ibrahim’s predicament in Malaysia. We should be aware of the fact that abuse of power through the use of archaic law is not merely a theoretical possibility but has in many jurisdictions been a painful reality.
We cannot pretend that we would be immune to such potential abuse of power. Imagine a scenario where a vocal critic is silenced through the application of s.377A. For example, the author of the Yawning Bread blog is, on an objective assessment, a vocal critic of the government. However, his criticisms are neither seditious nor defamatory. They are within the ambit of lawfully permitted speech. Nevertheless, if the state so desires, it could deploy s.377A against the author. Such potential for arbitrary use of power through the deployment of a law in a state of disuse is not just a theoretical possibility but also a practical problem when it materialises.
If the state sees justification in the criminalisation of a conduct, then that law must be enforced. If the state sees no justification for the enforcement of that particular law, then the state obviously does not believe in any justification for the criminalisation of that conduct proscribed by that law. In such a situation, when the law is in fact eventually enforced on an ad-hoc basis, it becomes a discretionary application of the law. The exercise of discretion by the Execeutive is always a worry when that discretion is unregulated. If the state is going to enforce s.377A on the basis of pure discretion, the law is susceptible to political abuse.
My view is that since the state appears not to believe in the need to enforce s.377A, that provision ought to be removed in order to prevent any future abuse of power. (For apologists of the status quo, imagine this: Dr Chee Soon Juan becomes the Prime Minister in 2030 and decides to have Mr K Shanmugam charged under s.377A using false allegations of engaging in homosexual acts with a former member of his staff. – I don’t intend to cast aspersions on the character of either Dr Chee or Mr Shanmugam by using this example. I have chosen to use this example so that the danger of leaving an unused law on the statute book can be driven home)
Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or abets the commission of, or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male person of, any act of gross indecency with another male person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 years.
What is our government's response to the Indian Court's decision?
“We have the law. We say it won’t be enforced. Is it totally clear? We, sometimes in these things, have to accept a bit of messiness.” - Mr K. Shanmugam, Minister of Law, 2nd Minister of Home Affairs.
Boy do I have a problem with that statement! The Law Minister is making a case for messiness in the law. Is it acceptable to have some messiness in the law?
The hallmark of the rule of law is the control of wide or discretionary power. Whenever the state is given power over citizens, that power must be regulated by law. Where the state has discretion in the use of power, that discretion must be regulated by law. Thus, in many areas of the exercise of authority, the Executive is required to operate within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution and by Acts of Parliament. Where the Executive is permitted discretion in the application of particular policies, our system allows for judicial review of such discretion. In this way, we seek to control abuse of power by subjecting all power to law.
We have a slightly different problem when there is a law that criminalises a certain conduct. The state is now authorised to prosecute an individual for the commission of an offence as deemed by that law. Where such authority exists, the expectation of the citizenry is that the law be applied consistently and efficiently. With regard to much of our criminal laws we have earned the reputation of consistent and efficient application. What then becomes of a law that is not enforced? Does it cease to be law by its disuse? Does it gradually fail to have any legal status by the very fact of its long term non-application? The answer is an emphatic No! A law is a law so long as it fulfils the criteria of validity within a legal system. If it is found in a statute, by the requirements of legal validity in Singapore, we would regard it as a law. This is without regard to whether it has become comatose.
So, what is the problem if there is a law that criminalises a certain conduct and that law has gone into a state of disuse but is nevertheless considered to be a law? It is possible for someone to assert from a practical standpoint: ‘Look. That is the law. We haven’t been enforcing it right? We won’t enforce it in the future. So, there is nothing to worry about. The law is a bit untidy. But, that is just going to be an abstract issue of academic importance. You won’t get charged for this offence. We are sincere about it.’ It is easy to be enticed by this supposed distinction between the practical and the theoretical.
I firmly believe that there is a practical reason for removing a law that the Executive and the Legislature regard as one that should not be enforced. If a law that the state has chosen not to enforce is retained, it becomes a tool in the hands of a future Executive that seeks to abuse power. In relation to s.377A of the Penal Code this is the problem. It is clear from statements made by some of our ministers as well as some Parliamentarians that there is no collective interest on the part of our State to enforce s.377A. They have made repeated assurances that they would not enforce the provision. This includes the latest assurance by the Law Minister: “We have the law. We say it will not be enforced. Is it totally clear?” To be fair, I have no reason to doubt Mr K Shanmugam’s sincerity when he asserted that. In fact, there appears to be a certain impatience in the phraseology revealing the sincerity that the Minister has with regard to the non-enforcement of s.377A. I do not take issue with the sincerity of our government on this issue. I do believe that they would not enforce s.377A against consenting adults carrying out the act in private. Whilst I do not believe s.377A would be enforced, I do believe that it exists as a powerful tool if the state is minded to abuse power. We are all familiar with Anwar Ibrahim’s predicament in Malaysia. We should be aware of the fact that abuse of power through the use of archaic law is not merely a theoretical possibility but has in many jurisdictions been a painful reality.
We cannot pretend that we would be immune to such potential abuse of power. Imagine a scenario where a vocal critic is silenced through the application of s.377A. For example, the author of the Yawning Bread blog is, on an objective assessment, a vocal critic of the government. However, his criticisms are neither seditious nor defamatory. They are within the ambit of lawfully permitted speech. Nevertheless, if the state so desires, it could deploy s.377A against the author. Such potential for arbitrary use of power through the deployment of a law in a state of disuse is not just a theoretical possibility but also a practical problem when it materialises.
If the state sees justification in the criminalisation of a conduct, then that law must be enforced. If the state sees no justification for the enforcement of that particular law, then the state obviously does not believe in any justification for the criminalisation of that conduct proscribed by that law. In such a situation, when the law is in fact eventually enforced on an ad-hoc basis, it becomes a discretionary application of the law. The exercise of discretion by the Execeutive is always a worry when that discretion is unregulated. If the state is going to enforce s.377A on the basis of pure discretion, the law is susceptible to political abuse.
My view is that since the state appears not to believe in the need to enforce s.377A, that provision ought to be removed in order to prevent any future abuse of power. (For apologists of the status quo, imagine this: Dr Chee Soon Juan becomes the Prime Minister in 2030 and decides to have Mr K Shanmugam charged under s.377A using false allegations of engaging in homosexual acts with a former member of his staff. – I don’t intend to cast aspersions on the character of either Dr Chee or Mr Shanmugam by using this example. I have chosen to use this example so that the danger of leaving an unused law on the statute book can be driven home)
Thursday, May 21, 2009
The Marxist Conspiracy of 1987 - revisiting a legal footnote
Five young activists have organized a gathering at Hong Lim Park to commemorate 21st May 1987. I’m glad to see that there are still many who recall the alleged ‘Marxist Conspiracy' of that era. I was 19 at that time and watched incredulously as a parade of tales emanated from the available media outlets.
There are so many things that we could recollect in relation to those days. Where were we? How did the news unfold? The general skepticism amongst many of us. I’d like to use this occasion to commemorate the day that our judiciary stood tall in the context of the rather limited legal role that it has in the review of executive action.
Chng Suan Tse v Minister for Home Affairs (1998) SLR 132
The case involved Operation Spectrum and the primary issue was over the court’s ability to review the Executive’s decision to detain under the Internal Security Act. It proved to be a landmark decision as the Court of Appeal chose to apply an objective test in assessing the discretion of the Executive instead of applying a purely subjective test as the courts had done in the past. Prior to this case, the position of the courts was to adopt a subjective approach as in the case of Lee Mau Seng v Minister for Home Affairs [1971] 2 MLJ 137.
What was the implication of the Chng Suan Tse decision? The Internal Security Act demands that the as a precondition to detention, the President be ‘satisfied’ as to certain matters. If the test was purely subjective as it was in Lee Mau Seng, there was little that a detainee could do to question the exercise of discretion. If the test was objective as propounded by the Court of Appeal in Chng Suan Tse, then it was possible for the court to assess at least whether objectively the President was ‘satisfied’.
The then Chief Justice, Wee Chong Jin stated in the judgment:
“In our view, the notion of a subjective or unfettered discretion is contrary to the rule of law. All power has legal limits and the rule of law demands that the courts should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary power. If therefore the executive in exercising its discretion under an Act of Parliament has exceeded the four corners within which Parliament has decided it can exercise its discretion, such an exercise of discretion would be ultra vires the Act and a court of law must be able to hold it to be so.”
“It must be clear therefore that the boundaries of the decisionmaker’s jurisdiction as conferred by an Act of Parliament is a question solely for the courts to decide. There is also, as counsel for the appellant has pointed out, no ouster clause in respect of s 8 or 10 of the ISA. Adopting the objective test in respect of ss 8 and 10 of the ISA would also be consistent with arts 9(2) and 93 of the Constitution. Further, it is, in our view, no answer to refer to accountability to Parliament as an alternative safeguard. As Lord Diplock put it in R v IRC, ex p National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617 at p 644:
It is not, in my view, a sufficient answer to say that judicial review of the actions of officers or departments of central government is unnecessary because they are accountable to Parliament for the way in which they carry out their functions. They are accountable to Parliament for what they do so far as regards efficiency and policy, and of that Parliament is the only judge; they are responsible to a court of justice for the lawfulness of what they do, and of that the court is the only judge
The Court went on to rule that:
"the President’s satisfaction under s 8 of the ISA and the minister’s satisfaction under s 10 of the ISA are both reviewable by a court of law as:
(1) the subjective test adopted in Karam Singh [1969] 2 MLJ 129 and its progeny can no longer be supported and the objective test is applicable upon a judicial review of the exercise of these discretions; and
(2) although a court will not question the executive’s decision as to what national security requires, the court can examine whether the executive’s decision was in fact based on national security considerations; similarly, although the court will not question whether detention was necessary for the purpose specified in s 8(1), the courts can examine whether the matters relied on by the executive fall within the scope of those specified purposes"
Of course, the story did not end there. Parliament duly amended the Internal Security Act in 1989 to nullify the effect of this case in relation to detentions under the ISA. By virtue of s.8B, the law on judicial review with regard to the ISA detentions was brought back to the position in 1971 and by virtue of s.8D the legislative change was to have effect in relation to any proceedings whether commenced before or after the amendment.
Law applicable to judicial review.
8B. —(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), the law governing the judicial review of any decision made or act done in pursuance of any power conferred upon the President or the Minister by the provisions of this Act shall be the same as was applicable and declared in Singapore on the 13th day of July 1971; and no part of the law before, on or after that date of any other country in the Commonwealth relating to judicial review shall apply.
(2) There shall be no judicial review in any court of any act done or decision made by the President or the Minister under the provisions of this Act save in regard to any question relating to compliance with any procedural requirement of this Act governing such act or decision.
- Act 2/89 wef 30.1.89.
Commencement provision.8D. Sections 8A and 8B shall apply to any proceedings instituted by way of judicial review of any decision made or act done under the provisions of this Act, whether such proceedings have been instituted before or after the commencement of the Internal Security (Amendment) Act 1989.
- Act 2/89wef30.1.89.
Friday, July 18, 2008
Of Word Games and Human Rights, democracy, rule of law and all that Jazz (Part 2)
In continuation of my earlier blog entry where i was analysing the Ministry of Law's response to the IBA report, I was planning to do an analysis of paragraphs 7 & 8. These are the relevant paragraphs:
7. The human rights allegations in the Report also have no substance. Singapore had responded in detail to them in our 9 April response to the draft report. Singapore, like nearly all countries, subscribes to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Human rights are interpreted and implemented according to the specific histories, cultures and circumstances of each country. Every society must find and decide the appropriate balance between rights and responsibilities for themselves. Human rights groups in IBAHRI have closed ranks with other Western human rights NGOs to prescribe for Singapore and all new countries, especially China, Western norms of liberal democracy as the only way to bring stability and prosperity. They believe that free market policies cannot succeed without Western liberal democracy, and it is their mission to make other societies adopt the Western model.
8. No NGO has greater interest and understanding of Singapore's history and internal balance than Singapore's leaders, to be able to set norms that will work for Singapore. Whatever the shortcomings of the Singapore government, from our record no one has doubted that our overriding objective has been to get Singaporeans better educated, to understand and be exposed to the globalised world we are now in. So we adjust our laws and systems to maximise the benefits from global forces to make Singapore a thriving cosmopolitan city, where Singaporeans and foreigners live and work in a peaceful, safe and open environment. We listen carefully to all advice and then decide the right balance for ourselves. So far we have not done badly.
I find it difficult to digest the idea that IBA is closing ranks with other NGOs or that it doesn't have a right to render a friendly advice. Before I could formulate my thoughts coherently and write about those two paragraphs, I have read the following from Michael Backman in The Age, 17 July 2008:
As you read through the measured paragraphs of the IBA report, you can almost feel the pleading; the advice to a friend: "you're wealthy, you're educated, you're like us now. Take that final step — join us — the community of civil, prosperous societies. Do it, before you embarrass yourself more." But this friend is too proud to listen.
The full article is at http://business.theage.com.au/business/uniqueness-of-perfection-that-sits-to-our-north-20080716-3gdz.html
Whilst I don't agree with every aspect of Backman's article, his characterisation of the IBAHRI report as an advice of a friend is very apt. We have reached a level of development where we can safely cross over to the other side. There is no point in our government repeatedly asserting that given our unique cultural, social, historical, etc. background, we have to chisel a system that works best for us. There is surely a system that worked for us in the economic developmental phase of nation-builidng. But, we must remember that we are building a nation and not a company. The next step is the emotional fulfilment of being Singaporean; of having a sense of belonging; of having a sense of civic responsibility; of having a stake in the decision-making process; of having a say in relation to government policies; of being able to critique the political goings-on without the constant fear (imagined or otherwise) of reprisal lurking next to every thought that we wish to express.
We are more educated. We are economically more well off. But, why must freedom languish in the abyss. Let us lift ourselves and march confidently. Criticisms sharpen our perspectives, broaden our understanding and ensure enlightened governance.
7. The human rights allegations in the Report also have no substance. Singapore had responded in detail to them in our 9 April response to the draft report. Singapore, like nearly all countries, subscribes to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Human rights are interpreted and implemented according to the specific histories, cultures and circumstances of each country. Every society must find and decide the appropriate balance between rights and responsibilities for themselves. Human rights groups in IBAHRI have closed ranks with other Western human rights NGOs to prescribe for Singapore and all new countries, especially China, Western norms of liberal democracy as the only way to bring stability and prosperity. They believe that free market policies cannot succeed without Western liberal democracy, and it is their mission to make other societies adopt the Western model.
8. No NGO has greater interest and understanding of Singapore's history and internal balance than Singapore's leaders, to be able to set norms that will work for Singapore. Whatever the shortcomings of the Singapore government, from our record no one has doubted that our overriding objective has been to get Singaporeans better educated, to understand and be exposed to the globalised world we are now in. So we adjust our laws and systems to maximise the benefits from global forces to make Singapore a thriving cosmopolitan city, where Singaporeans and foreigners live and work in a peaceful, safe and open environment. We listen carefully to all advice and then decide the right balance for ourselves. So far we have not done badly.
I find it difficult to digest the idea that IBA is closing ranks with other NGOs or that it doesn't have a right to render a friendly advice. Before I could formulate my thoughts coherently and write about those two paragraphs, I have read the following from Michael Backman in The Age, 17 July 2008:
As you read through the measured paragraphs of the IBA report, you can almost feel the pleading; the advice to a friend: "you're wealthy, you're educated, you're like us now. Take that final step — join us — the community of civil, prosperous societies. Do it, before you embarrass yourself more." But this friend is too proud to listen.
The full article is at http://business.theage.com.au/business/uniqueness-of-perfection-that-sits-to-our-north-20080716-3gdz.html
Whilst I don't agree with every aspect of Backman's article, his characterisation of the IBAHRI report as an advice of a friend is very apt. We have reached a level of development where we can safely cross over to the other side. There is no point in our government repeatedly asserting that given our unique cultural, social, historical, etc. background, we have to chisel a system that works best for us. There is surely a system that worked for us in the economic developmental phase of nation-builidng. But, we must remember that we are building a nation and not a company. The next step is the emotional fulfilment of being Singaporean; of having a sense of belonging; of having a sense of civic responsibility; of having a stake in the decision-making process; of having a say in relation to government policies; of being able to critique the political goings-on without the constant fear (imagined or otherwise) of reprisal lurking next to every thought that we wish to express.
We are more educated. We are economically more well off. But, why must freedom languish in the abyss. Let us lift ourselves and march confidently. Criticisms sharpen our perspectives, broaden our understanding and ensure enlightened governance.
Friday, July 11, 2008
Of word games and human rights, democracy, rule of law and all that jazz
The International Bar Association has released a report entitled, ‘Prosperity versus Individual Rights? Human Rights, Democracy and the rule of law in Singapore.’ The Ministry of Law has responded swiftly to the report. Let’s see what the Ministry has to say.
From para 2 of MinLaw’s response:“2. From a quick perusal of the Executive Summary, we note that IBAHRI has not taken into account our comments on their draft report, sent on 9 April 2008. We release a copy of our comments previously given to the Chairman of the IBAHRI on the draft report, for your reference.”
It is MinLaw’s assertion that IBAHRI had not taken into account their comments. This is a reference to a letter dated 9 April 2008 from Mark Jayaratnam, Deputy Director of the Legal Policy Division of the Ministry of Law. I went through the IBAHRI report and for good measure I used the ‘search’ tool available for pdf files. Mark Jayaratnam’s letter is referenced by the report 19 times. They have ‘taken into account’ the comments. Although, it is clear that it does not necessarily agree with the comments, IBAHRI has, where appropriate, quoted from the letter to illustrate the Singapore Government’s viewpoint.
The moral of the story… don’t jump to conclusions based on a quick perusal of the Executive Summary. Surely, the Executive Summary is not going to exhibit the government’s comments. I suspect that when MinLaw asserts that IBAHRI did not take into account the comments, what they really had in the mind was that IBAHRI did not agree with their comments. One can take into account an opposing thesis and then disagree. The fact that one disagrees does not mean that one has not taken into account the opposing thesis.
From para 3 of MinLaw’s response:
“3. The IBAHRI Report questions the independence of the Singapore Judiciary. This is contradicted by Mr Fernando Pombo, President of the IBA, who stated in his opening speech at the IBA Conference in Singapore last October that lawyers the world over were coming to Singapore because:
"this country has an outstanding legal profession, an outstanding judiciary, an outstanding academical world in relation to the law".”
It is quite clear from the IBAHRI Report that the allegations directed at the issue of the independence of the judiciary are muted and qualified. IBAHRI does not go all out to claim that the judiciary is not independent. They have acknowledged the high standards maintained by the judiciary and the high standards within our legal system. But, they have sought to address the nagging doubt that is raised by some of the ‘political’ cases that have appeared before the courts. The criticism is measured and I believe it is not inconsistent with the IBA President’s comments at the IBA Conference last year.
“The judiciary in Singapore has a good international reputation for the integrity of their judgments when adjudicating commercial cases that do not involve the interests of PAP members or their associates. However, in cases involving PAP litigants or PAP interests, there are concerns about an actual or apparent lack of impartiality and/or independence, which casts doubt on the decisions made in such cases. Although this may not go so far as claimed by some non-governmental organisations, which allege that the judiciary is entirely controlled by the will of the executive, there are sufficient reasons to worry about the influence of the executive over judicial decision making. Regardless of any actual interference, the reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient. In addition, it appears that some of the objective characteristics of judicial independence, including security of tenure, separation from the executive branch and administrative independence may be absent from the Singapore judicial system.”
IBAHRI’s comments and their findings do not assert an actual executive interference in judicial affairs. In fact, they are suggesting that there is room for improvement. After all, justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done.
From Para 4 of MinLaw’s response:
“4. Other independent observers agree. The Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC), which rates Asian countries on their business and legal environments, regularly rates the Singapore judiciary highly. PERC's Asian Intelligence Report 2006 explained that this was because the Singapore judiciary demonstrated three essential elements of judicial independence. First, the courts and individual judges within the system are publicly perceived to be impartial in their decisions. Second, judicial decisions are accepted by contesting parties and the larger public. Third, judges are perceived to be free from undue interference from other branches of government. The IBAHRI Report failed to acknowledge these facts.”
IBAHRI does refer to the PERC Asian Intelligence Report of 2006. In the section D of the Report under the heading ‘Singapore’s International Rankings’, IBAHRI has outline a number of rankings that rate Singapore very highly and some that rank Singapore poorly. Specifically in relation to the judiciary, this is what they say:
“In the judicial and legal system rankings, Singapore has also performed well in international assessments. In Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2006, which measures the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians, Singapore ranked fifth in the word. Similarly, in an Asian-only based report, the Political & Economic Risk Consultancy’s Asian Intelligence Report 2006, strong commendation of Singapore’s judicial system was made, stating: ‘Within Asia, Hong Kong and Singapore are the only two systems with judiciaries that rate on a par with those in developed Western societies…’
So, the bone of contention for MinLaw is that IBAHRI did not acknowledge all of the accolades given by PERC. Clearly, if IBAHRI intended to carry out an independent study, it would take into account the findings of multiple sources and draw its own conclusions. We can’t expect IBAHRI to rubber stamp PERC’s findings. All that this indicates is that there is a variety of opinion out there about our judiciary. In any event, the point that IBAHRI seems to make is not so much that our judiciary is not independent but rather that there is a perception of lack of independence.
From Para 5 of MinLaw’s response5. The IBAHRI Report did acknowledge that "Singapore has a good international reputation for the integrity of their judgments when adjudicating commercial cases", but it alleged that for cases that involve "the interests of PAP members or their associates", there were "concerns about an actual or apparent lack of impartiality and/or independence". Instead of substantiating this grave allegation with evidence, the Report argued that "regardless of any actual interference, the reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient". This is a feeble justification.
Oh my God! Feeble justification. A very important principle of procedural justice is a ‘feeble justification’. Justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done. This principle is basic. The point is best illustrated through using the process of adjudication. If I judge a civil dispute involving my son as the Plaintiff and some other person as the Defendant, I might still be able to do the honourable thing and adjudicate impartially. I might assure the defendant that I will adjudicate based on the law and the evidence before me and that the Plaintiff will be treated as just any other person. It is not inconceivable that a true man of conscience with a deep sense of justice would be able to perform this separation of reason and emotion.
There is a story about a Chola king in Tamil Nadu that has passed into legend and it is eulogised in classical Tamil literature. Manu-needi Cholan had a son who killed a calf by riding his chariot over it. The king had a petition-bell outside the palace. Any person who felt aggrieved may ring the bell and seek justice. The mother of the calf was ringing the bell violently. The king eventually discovered through his aides the full story pertaining to the killing of the calf. He then ordered that his son be punished for the crime that he committed.
This story is always presented as an indication of how an honourable king would behave when adjudicating a dispute. The unstated fact is that impartiality in adjudication is not a norm and is usually an exception. Surely the norm is that a king would have difficulties in being impartial when his own son is involved. So, it is important that the king does not place himself in a position of a judge when his own son is the object of the complaint. However, that old Tamil story seeks to instill the value of impartiality within the ruler rather than to insist that a system of impartiality be created to distance the king from the adjudicative process so that we can guard against the human frailty (which is a norm rather than an exception).
In English law, which we have inherited, there is a deep sense of impartiality in decision-making that has been implanted within civil and criminal proceedings. In fact, instead of taking chances with the ability of fallible human beings in performing the mental gymnastics of separating their personal emotions (fear, favour, vested interests) from the rational processes, there is a principle of natural justice that no man shall be a judge in his own cause. If a judge is faced with a Plaintiff or a Defendant in a case and there is a personal financial or non-financial interest that the judge has in the case, he must not hear the case. The principle extends beyond actual bias and deals with apparent bias as well. Our own courts have in many cases held the principle to be of application in Singapore. Of course, this is a principle that is utilised in the course of judicial proceedings. So, a judgment can be quashed not only where actual bias is proven but also on the basis of apparent bias.
Therefore, in the context of judicial impartiality and/or independence, there is no reason why the standard of apparent lack of impartiality and/or independence should not be applied.
IBAHRI’s assertion is as follows:
“However, in cases involving PAP litigants or PAP interests, there are concerns about an actual or apparent lack of impartiality and/or independence, which casts doubt on the decisions made in such cases. Although this may not go so far as claimed by some non-governmental organisations, which allege that the judiciary is entirely controlled by the will of the executive, there are sufficient reasons to worry about the influence of the executive over judicial decision making. Regardless of any actual interference, the reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient.”
Note that the report does not state that there is no impartiality or independence. It states that there are ‘concerns’ about the ‘actual’ ‘or’ ‘apparent’ lack of impartiality and/or independence. In fact, they were at pains to point out that they were breaking ranks with other NGOs that go overboard in criticising the judiciary in Singapore.
This, however, is the allegedly ‘feeble’ point that they are trying to make: “regardless of any actual interference, the reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient.”
The point is that it is not enough for a government to assert that there is no interference. Efforts must be made to ensure that the system is not capable of being abused. Efforts must be made to ensure that the system does not allow for the possibility of interference. Efforts must be made to ensure that there can be no reasonable perception of interference. In its report, IBAHRI uses the examples of Judge Michael Khoo, the trend in defamation suits and the Jeyaratnam case that went up to the Privy Council to illustrate the perception of interference. It is clear from the report that there is no actual evidence of interference.
When IBAHRI states that reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient, they mean that a modern state such as Singapore should strive for a higher governance standard. We can no longer be judged like a third world country. We have first world standards in so many aspects of our life. Is there anything wrong in seeking to have a system of governance that excludes the possibility of executive interference in the judiciary?
From para 6 of MinLaw’s response
6. The cases brought by PAP members usually relate to scurrilous and completely untrue allegations of corruption made against them. Providing clean and efficient governance is a longstanding cornerstone of the PAP Government's policy. Thus defamatory allegations cannot be allowed to rest. The accuser has to prove his allegations. The decisions of the Courts in these cases are matters of public record, and can be analysed. Anyone questioning these verdicts should try to do so by examining these decisions properly, rather than making vague unsubstantiated allegations. What the western media continually criticise is that Singapore does not adopt Western, i.e. American, defamation laws that give the media freedom to report libellous untruths without liability to pay damages. It is also absurd to suggest that honourable and upright judges in commercial cases become compliant and dishonourable when dealing with defamation cases involving government ministers.
I will be fair to our judiciary in those defamation suits. The decisions have remained within the rational limits of the English law of defamation that we have inherited. Using defamation suits alone as a basis for alleging the perception of lack of judicial independence would be insufficient. IBAHRI does not rely on the defamation suits alone. In fact in relation to defamation suits, the bone of contention appears to be that statistically, PAP litigants have received much higher damages compared to non-PAP litigants. Incidentally, the IBAHRI statistics are a bit outdated. They end at 1999. IBAHRI also takes issue with the Summary Judgment procedure that is available under our Rules of Court for defamation suits. When a matter is disposed via Summary Judgment, the matter is not heard in open court. In suits involving politicians, this can run counter to the need for the public to view the proceedings so that they can form their own opinion and so that no allegations of executive interference can be made in the judicial process. It is from this perspective that IBAHRI have made their observations vis a vis he defamation suits.
Para 7 and para 8 of MinLaw’s response deserves a separate comment which I will attempt to do in a separate blog.
From para 2 of MinLaw’s response:“2. From a quick perusal of the Executive Summary, we note that IBAHRI has not taken into account our comments on their draft report, sent on 9 April 2008. We release a copy of our comments previously given to the Chairman of the IBAHRI on the draft report, for your reference.”
It is MinLaw’s assertion that IBAHRI had not taken into account their comments. This is a reference to a letter dated 9 April 2008 from Mark Jayaratnam, Deputy Director of the Legal Policy Division of the Ministry of Law. I went through the IBAHRI report and for good measure I used the ‘search’ tool available for pdf files. Mark Jayaratnam’s letter is referenced by the report 19 times. They have ‘taken into account’ the comments. Although, it is clear that it does not necessarily agree with the comments, IBAHRI has, where appropriate, quoted from the letter to illustrate the Singapore Government’s viewpoint.
The moral of the story… don’t jump to conclusions based on a quick perusal of the Executive Summary. Surely, the Executive Summary is not going to exhibit the government’s comments. I suspect that when MinLaw asserts that IBAHRI did not take into account the comments, what they really had in the mind was that IBAHRI did not agree with their comments. One can take into account an opposing thesis and then disagree. The fact that one disagrees does not mean that one has not taken into account the opposing thesis.
From para 3 of MinLaw’s response:
“3. The IBAHRI Report questions the independence of the Singapore Judiciary. This is contradicted by Mr Fernando Pombo, President of the IBA, who stated in his opening speech at the IBA Conference in Singapore last October that lawyers the world over were coming to Singapore because:
"this country has an outstanding legal profession, an outstanding judiciary, an outstanding academical world in relation to the law".”
It is quite clear from the IBAHRI Report that the allegations directed at the issue of the independence of the judiciary are muted and qualified. IBAHRI does not go all out to claim that the judiciary is not independent. They have acknowledged the high standards maintained by the judiciary and the high standards within our legal system. But, they have sought to address the nagging doubt that is raised by some of the ‘political’ cases that have appeared before the courts. The criticism is measured and I believe it is not inconsistent with the IBA President’s comments at the IBA Conference last year.
“The judiciary in Singapore has a good international reputation for the integrity of their judgments when adjudicating commercial cases that do not involve the interests of PAP members or their associates. However, in cases involving PAP litigants or PAP interests, there are concerns about an actual or apparent lack of impartiality and/or independence, which casts doubt on the decisions made in such cases. Although this may not go so far as claimed by some non-governmental organisations, which allege that the judiciary is entirely controlled by the will of the executive, there are sufficient reasons to worry about the influence of the executive over judicial decision making. Regardless of any actual interference, the reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient. In addition, it appears that some of the objective characteristics of judicial independence, including security of tenure, separation from the executive branch and administrative independence may be absent from the Singapore judicial system.”
IBAHRI’s comments and their findings do not assert an actual executive interference in judicial affairs. In fact, they are suggesting that there is room for improvement. After all, justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done.
From Para 4 of MinLaw’s response:
“4. Other independent observers agree. The Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC), which rates Asian countries on their business and legal environments, regularly rates the Singapore judiciary highly. PERC's Asian Intelligence Report 2006 explained that this was because the Singapore judiciary demonstrated three essential elements of judicial independence. First, the courts and individual judges within the system are publicly perceived to be impartial in their decisions. Second, judicial decisions are accepted by contesting parties and the larger public. Third, judges are perceived to be free from undue interference from other branches of government. The IBAHRI Report failed to acknowledge these facts.”
IBAHRI does refer to the PERC Asian Intelligence Report of 2006. In the section D of the Report under the heading ‘Singapore’s International Rankings’, IBAHRI has outline a number of rankings that rate Singapore very highly and some that rank Singapore poorly. Specifically in relation to the judiciary, this is what they say:
“In the judicial and legal system rankings, Singapore has also performed well in international assessments. In Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2006, which measures the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians, Singapore ranked fifth in the word. Similarly, in an Asian-only based report, the Political & Economic Risk Consultancy’s Asian Intelligence Report 2006, strong commendation of Singapore’s judicial system was made, stating: ‘Within Asia, Hong Kong and Singapore are the only two systems with judiciaries that rate on a par with those in developed Western societies…’
So, the bone of contention for MinLaw is that IBAHRI did not acknowledge all of the accolades given by PERC. Clearly, if IBAHRI intended to carry out an independent study, it would take into account the findings of multiple sources and draw its own conclusions. We can’t expect IBAHRI to rubber stamp PERC’s findings. All that this indicates is that there is a variety of opinion out there about our judiciary. In any event, the point that IBAHRI seems to make is not so much that our judiciary is not independent but rather that there is a perception of lack of independence.
From Para 5 of MinLaw’s response5. The IBAHRI Report did acknowledge that "Singapore has a good international reputation for the integrity of their judgments when adjudicating commercial cases", but it alleged that for cases that involve "the interests of PAP members or their associates", there were "concerns about an actual or apparent lack of impartiality and/or independence". Instead of substantiating this grave allegation with evidence, the Report argued that "regardless of any actual interference, the reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient". This is a feeble justification.
Oh my God! Feeble justification. A very important principle of procedural justice is a ‘feeble justification’. Justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done. This principle is basic. The point is best illustrated through using the process of adjudication. If I judge a civil dispute involving my son as the Plaintiff and some other person as the Defendant, I might still be able to do the honourable thing and adjudicate impartially. I might assure the defendant that I will adjudicate based on the law and the evidence before me and that the Plaintiff will be treated as just any other person. It is not inconceivable that a true man of conscience with a deep sense of justice would be able to perform this separation of reason and emotion.
There is a story about a Chola king in Tamil Nadu that has passed into legend and it is eulogised in classical Tamil literature. Manu-needi Cholan had a son who killed a calf by riding his chariot over it. The king had a petition-bell outside the palace. Any person who felt aggrieved may ring the bell and seek justice. The mother of the calf was ringing the bell violently. The king eventually discovered through his aides the full story pertaining to the killing of the calf. He then ordered that his son be punished for the crime that he committed.
This story is always presented as an indication of how an honourable king would behave when adjudicating a dispute. The unstated fact is that impartiality in adjudication is not a norm and is usually an exception. Surely the norm is that a king would have difficulties in being impartial when his own son is involved. So, it is important that the king does not place himself in a position of a judge when his own son is the object of the complaint. However, that old Tamil story seeks to instill the value of impartiality within the ruler rather than to insist that a system of impartiality be created to distance the king from the adjudicative process so that we can guard against the human frailty (which is a norm rather than an exception).
In English law, which we have inherited, there is a deep sense of impartiality in decision-making that has been implanted within civil and criminal proceedings. In fact, instead of taking chances with the ability of fallible human beings in performing the mental gymnastics of separating their personal emotions (fear, favour, vested interests) from the rational processes, there is a principle of natural justice that no man shall be a judge in his own cause. If a judge is faced with a Plaintiff or a Defendant in a case and there is a personal financial or non-financial interest that the judge has in the case, he must not hear the case. The principle extends beyond actual bias and deals with apparent bias as well. Our own courts have in many cases held the principle to be of application in Singapore. Of course, this is a principle that is utilised in the course of judicial proceedings. So, a judgment can be quashed not only where actual bias is proven but also on the basis of apparent bias.
Therefore, in the context of judicial impartiality and/or independence, there is no reason why the standard of apparent lack of impartiality and/or independence should not be applied.
IBAHRI’s assertion is as follows:
“However, in cases involving PAP litigants or PAP interests, there are concerns about an actual or apparent lack of impartiality and/or independence, which casts doubt on the decisions made in such cases. Although this may not go so far as claimed by some non-governmental organisations, which allege that the judiciary is entirely controlled by the will of the executive, there are sufficient reasons to worry about the influence of the executive over judicial decision making. Regardless of any actual interference, the reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient.”
Note that the report does not state that there is no impartiality or independence. It states that there are ‘concerns’ about the ‘actual’ ‘or’ ‘apparent’ lack of impartiality and/or independence. In fact, they were at pains to point out that they were breaking ranks with other NGOs that go overboard in criticising the judiciary in Singapore.
This, however, is the allegedly ‘feeble’ point that they are trying to make: “regardless of any actual interference, the reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient.”
The point is that it is not enough for a government to assert that there is no interference. Efforts must be made to ensure that the system is not capable of being abused. Efforts must be made to ensure that the system does not allow for the possibility of interference. Efforts must be made to ensure that there can be no reasonable perception of interference. In its report, IBAHRI uses the examples of Judge Michael Khoo, the trend in defamation suits and the Jeyaratnam case that went up to the Privy Council to illustrate the perception of interference. It is clear from the report that there is no actual evidence of interference.
When IBAHRI states that reasonable suspicion of interference is sufficient, they mean that a modern state such as Singapore should strive for a higher governance standard. We can no longer be judged like a third world country. We have first world standards in so many aspects of our life. Is there anything wrong in seeking to have a system of governance that excludes the possibility of executive interference in the judiciary?
From para 6 of MinLaw’s response
6. The cases brought by PAP members usually relate to scurrilous and completely untrue allegations of corruption made against them. Providing clean and efficient governance is a longstanding cornerstone of the PAP Government's policy. Thus defamatory allegations cannot be allowed to rest. The accuser has to prove his allegations. The decisions of the Courts in these cases are matters of public record, and can be analysed. Anyone questioning these verdicts should try to do so by examining these decisions properly, rather than making vague unsubstantiated allegations. What the western media continually criticise is that Singapore does not adopt Western, i.e. American, defamation laws that give the media freedom to report libellous untruths without liability to pay damages. It is also absurd to suggest that honourable and upright judges in commercial cases become compliant and dishonourable when dealing with defamation cases involving government ministers.
I will be fair to our judiciary in those defamation suits. The decisions have remained within the rational limits of the English law of defamation that we have inherited. Using defamation suits alone as a basis for alleging the perception of lack of judicial independence would be insufficient. IBAHRI does not rely on the defamation suits alone. In fact in relation to defamation suits, the bone of contention appears to be that statistically, PAP litigants have received much higher damages compared to non-PAP litigants. Incidentally, the IBAHRI statistics are a bit outdated. They end at 1999. IBAHRI also takes issue with the Summary Judgment procedure that is available under our Rules of Court for defamation suits. When a matter is disposed via Summary Judgment, the matter is not heard in open court. In suits involving politicians, this can run counter to the need for the public to view the proceedings so that they can form their own opinion and so that no allegations of executive interference can be made in the judicial process. It is from this perspective that IBAHRI have made their observations vis a vis he defamation suits.
Para 7 and para 8 of MinLaw’s response deserves a separate comment which I will attempt to do in a separate blog.
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