Anson was a long time ago. CV Devan Nair vacated his seat in Parliament before his elevation to the position of President. J B Jeyaretnam participated in the by-election for the Anson constituency and recorded that historic win against the PAP. 1981 seems like a distant memory now. The PAP stranglehold on Parliament had been punctured. There was a lone voice catapulted into the legislature willing to champion the cause of the people against the mammoth PAP government.
We had not progressed that much from then. At the very best (before 2011), the opposition managed 4 seats in Parliament. But, for the most part, it was just 2 seats. It was, therefore, fitting that last year (being the 30th anniversary of the Anson victory) another milestone was crossed in Singapore's electoral history. The fall of a GRC was a big psychological boost for the opposition and its supporters. It has also ushered in an unprecedented boldness and a willingness express views fearlessly.
The GRC itself was one of the methods by which the ruling party managed to keep the opposition at bay. There is no doubt in my mind that if the GRC system had never been introduced, the PAP would have lost more seats in earlier elections. (My views on the mechanics of domination exercised through the GRC..... http://article14.blogspot.com/2009/06/uniquely-singapore-papmandering.html )
Throughout this period from the 1980s to the present, the PAP has also been careful to avoid by-elections. To me, the most disappointing moment was when the Bukit Batok MP, Ong Chit Chung, passed away. There was a conflict between the Constitution and a statutory provision and in my view the Constitution ought to prevail. They made no Constitutional amendment and they just gave elaborate excuses and convinced the masses that no by-election was necessary. (I had blogged about this before.... http://article14.blogspot.com/search/label/Bukit%20Batok ) In the end, Bukit Batok went without a member of parliament for nearly 3 years (July 2008 to May 2011).
And now, we have an opposition MP that has vacated his seat. A by-election has to be called. The problem is that our laws are silent as to the time limit for calling a by-election. Pursuant to the Constitution, when an MP is sacked by his Party, the MP's seat falls vacant. Under the Parliamentary Elections Act, the President has to issue a Writ of Election. No time limit is set for this. Under the Constitution, this is one of those powers of the President that does not come within his discretion and it is for the Cabinet to advise him. The problem now is the PM seems to think that there are pressing national issues and so he seems to suggest that a by-election is not within him immediate focus.
This is an area that has to be legislated. I hope that this issue is not left as a mere discretion and a certain timeline be set for by elections in the future. We could do it by legislation or if our politicians are mature enough a multi-party code can be devised where political parties can agree to hold by elections within a fixed time frame when there is a casual vacancy.
It is totally untenable to leave the question of a by-election hanging in the air and in fact it is irresponsible to let Hougang residents hanging in there without a member of parliament.
Showing posts with label GRC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label GRC. Show all posts
Sunday, February 19, 2012
Thursday, May 12, 2011
GRCs – where do we go from here?
The Group Representation Constituency system was introduced in the 1988 elections ostensibly for the purpose of ensuring minority representation in Parliament. In the 2011 general elections, the PAP has lost 2 of its ministers through the loss of Aljunied GRC. The Workers’ Party raised the stakes by placing its best candidates in Aljunied knowing that the closet election battle in the last election was fought in this GRC. They won the bet.
Now, more than ever before, there is an urgent need to talk about the GRC system. There is an urgency to deal with this system whilst PAP supporters themselves are bitter with the loss of George Yeo. For a long time, opposition supporters have maintained that the GRC system unfairly disadvantages opposition parties and favours the incumbent. Well, it is equally dangerous for the PAP: the loss of a GRC means the loss of at least one or two ministers depending on the particular GRC.
Let us examine the stated rationale for the GRC system and whether it has any merits:
Minority representation
The official reason for the introduction of the GRC system in 1988 was to ensure that candidates from minority races can still be represented in Parliament. Was Singapore in danger of voting along racial lines back then in the 1980s? The evidence shows that PAP candidates of Indian and Malay origin had little difficulty in defeating Chinese opponents from opposition parties. Equally true is the fact that the first opposition MP to enter into Parliament was JB Jeyaretnam of the Workers’ Party in a constituency where the majority of residents were Chinese. The truth is that Singaporeans had not been voting along racial lines as at 1998 and it remains true that Singaporeans have not been voting along racial lines since then.
Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find a Singaporean who would vote along racial lines. Most Singaporeans can be classified into pro-PAP, anti-PAP, pro-a-particular-opposition party or just simply apathetic or unconcerned.
People vote along racial lines? Here in Singapore? We don’t buy that.
We may be told to rewind the clock back to the 1950s and 1960s. We may be told that racial divisions were real and were about to tear our society apart. We may be told that even though we notice such divisions today, they are still there below the surface waiting to blow up in our face at the slightest instigation.
If we are to believe that, then we must accept that 4 decades of nation building has been a failure; 4 decades of talking about racial harmony has been a failure; 4 decades of attempting to build a Singaporean identity has been a failure. But, I find that hard to accept.
Sure. There are racists in Singapore. There is racial discrimination here and there. Singaporeans have racial stereotypes about each other. But, to the credit of the Chinese majority in Singapore, they have never derided their politicians because of their race. Many minority race candidates from the PAP and the opposition have been received well by the Chinese majority. We are not in danger of slipping into a race based voting pattern. I know of so many Chinese friends who speak adoringly of JBJ and have a lot of contempt for LKY. Race has not been a factor in the way that the majority race votes in Singapore and with the high degree of tolerance and integration that we have amongst Singaporeans, it is unlikely that race will become a factor in the foreseeable.
So, the need to ensure minority race protection is nothing more than a hypothetical argument. In 1988, the PAP government was trying to ‘solve’ a hypothetical problem. Now, let us assume for a moment that minority race representation in Parliament is an issue to be catered for. Is the GRC system necessarily the best way to deal with it? Can’t such protection be ensured through a minimum quota of seats in Parliament? Under the present system, there are 15 GRCs. That translates into a reservation of 15 minority race seats in Parliament. If minority race representation is the true reason for introducing the GRC system, I suggest that a better system of ensuring minority race representation would be to reserve 15 constituencies as minority race seats. Any political party fielding candidates in those constituencies must field a person from a minority race. (I am personally opposed to this idea of creating a quota. But, playing ball with the PAP’s officially stated rationale, an alternative and better approach to the GRC would be a SMC system with a fixed quota for minorities)
What the GRC system really does is that it shields weaker candidates from electoral defeat. Back in 2009 I had blogged about manipulation of the electoral system and in that context the following analysis of Eunos GRC is something stand by still:
“Given the lack of proportionality that is inherent in the system, layering the GRC over it helps to aggravate the disproportionality. With the introduction of the GRC system, it is possible that some MPs that may have lost their individual seats are rescued by stronger candidates in other constituencies. The practice of having a Minister head a GRC team places an apprehension in the minds of voters that if the team loses, the Minister would no longer be able to serve in his office. Weak candidates within the GRC would benefit from the presence of a Minister on their team.
Let us take the Eunos GRC example. In the 1988 elections, Eunos GRC was a 3 member ward. The votes in favour of PAP – 36,500. The votes in favour of WP – 35,221. If the 3 constituencies that were a part of the GRC were single member constituencies in that elections, it is highly likely that at least one of the PAP candidates would have lost his seat. It is likely that Francis Seow would have won a seat in his constituency. In fact, with a vote difference of 1,279 votes, I would not be surprised if 2 PAP MPs had in fact lost to the opposition in the Eunos GRC(if only the Elections Department were to release the detailed results).
The same analysis can be applied to the Eunos GRC of the 1991 elections. This time around it was composed of 4 constituencies. PAP obtained 45,833 votes as opposed to 41,673 for the WP. With a vote difference of 4,160, again it is likely that at least one of the PAP candidates would have lost the seat in a conventional single member seat.
Through the GRC system, the PAP has managed to keep some of its MPs in Parliament where they would otherwise have found it tough going in a single member constituency. The growth in the size and number of GRCs was accompanied by the disappearance of most of the single member constituencies. This is another unique form of electoral management that has ensured the PAP’s continued super-majority in Parliament.”
The fact is that through the GRC system PAP had managed in the early years of its introduction to avoid losing seats in Parliament to candidates that would have posed a serious threat in Parliament such as Francis Seow and Tang Liang Hong. Single member constituencies that were too hot for the PAP to handle such as Bukit Batok, Bukit Gombak and Ulu Pandan (amongst others) were quickly obsorbed into GRCs. The GRCs started growing in size from the original 3 member groups to 5 and 6 member groups. Over time, it has also become evident that the GRC system is a useful way by which the PAP is able to regenerate itself and to train newbies. Every new candidate introduced in a general election by the PAP is shielded by a Minister or two in a GRC. People would generally not dare to vote out a minister and the new candidate would effectively be protected that way. This rationale has been evident in the PAP rhetoric in the last two elections and in fact it was elevated to a new level in this election this year.
PAP ministers have been repeating the warning that a Minister could be lost if voters went against the PAP in a GRC. In the 2006 election, much was made about George Yeo’s experience and credentials as a Foreign Minister. In the 2011 election, we have seen again how the PAP made much ado about the possibility of losing a Minister if Aljunied GRC were to be lost.
So, it has come to pass. Aljunied has been lost to the Workers’ Party. The residents of Aljunied have rejected the PAP’s arguments. The desire for a voice in Parliament has been so overwhelming that the WP team in Aljunied pulled off a vote swing of 10% in a GRC where precincts were moved out into Ang Mo Kio GRC and precincts were brought in from Marine Parade in an attempt by the incumbent to dilute pro-opposition votes.
Low Thia Khiang said on nomination day that it is time to teach the PAP a lesson. Well, the lesson has been delivered. But, has the PAP learnt anything?
And there is one more thing. This election has really exposed the GRC system in a big way. Tin Pei Ling can become an MP. Half a dozen faceless individuals in the PAP ranks can become MPs. But, George Yeo, Tan Jee Say, Vincent Wijeysinha and several other credible individuals can be left out of Parliament. The net effect: the GRC system is inherently inefficient in delivering the best outcome. The most credible candidates would enter Parliament in a straight one to one contest. But, in a system that shields the incompetent, Parliament suffers in quality.
To summarise:
1. I don’t buy the argument that GRCs protect minorities.
2. If we really want to protect minorities, we could have a fixed quota of SMCs for that purpose.
3. GRCs have favoured the PAP because of the all-or-nothing effect that they produce
4. GRCs permit less than competent candidates to enter Parliament through the presence of Ministers
5. When a GRC is lost due to backlash, a good PAP candidate can be lost along with the whole team
There is one more point that I did not make above. The first past the post system that we have inherited from the British is not representative of the votes of the people. The GRC system amplifies this problem and our Parliament has become dramatically unrepresentative. 6 seats out of 87 seats as representation for 40% of the population that voted for the opposition? That is atrocious.
Now, more than ever before, there is an urgent need to talk about the GRC system. There is an urgency to deal with this system whilst PAP supporters themselves are bitter with the loss of George Yeo. For a long time, opposition supporters have maintained that the GRC system unfairly disadvantages opposition parties and favours the incumbent. Well, it is equally dangerous for the PAP: the loss of a GRC means the loss of at least one or two ministers depending on the particular GRC.
Let us examine the stated rationale for the GRC system and whether it has any merits:
Minority representation
The official reason for the introduction of the GRC system in 1988 was to ensure that candidates from minority races can still be represented in Parliament. Was Singapore in danger of voting along racial lines back then in the 1980s? The evidence shows that PAP candidates of Indian and Malay origin had little difficulty in defeating Chinese opponents from opposition parties. Equally true is the fact that the first opposition MP to enter into Parliament was JB Jeyaretnam of the Workers’ Party in a constituency where the majority of residents were Chinese. The truth is that Singaporeans had not been voting along racial lines as at 1998 and it remains true that Singaporeans have not been voting along racial lines since then.
Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find a Singaporean who would vote along racial lines. Most Singaporeans can be classified into pro-PAP, anti-PAP, pro-a-particular-opposition party or just simply apathetic or unconcerned.
People vote along racial lines? Here in Singapore? We don’t buy that.
We may be told to rewind the clock back to the 1950s and 1960s. We may be told that racial divisions were real and were about to tear our society apart. We may be told that even though we notice such divisions today, they are still there below the surface waiting to blow up in our face at the slightest instigation.
If we are to believe that, then we must accept that 4 decades of nation building has been a failure; 4 decades of talking about racial harmony has been a failure; 4 decades of attempting to build a Singaporean identity has been a failure. But, I find that hard to accept.
Sure. There are racists in Singapore. There is racial discrimination here and there. Singaporeans have racial stereotypes about each other. But, to the credit of the Chinese majority in Singapore, they have never derided their politicians because of their race. Many minority race candidates from the PAP and the opposition have been received well by the Chinese majority. We are not in danger of slipping into a race based voting pattern. I know of so many Chinese friends who speak adoringly of JBJ and have a lot of contempt for LKY. Race has not been a factor in the way that the majority race votes in Singapore and with the high degree of tolerance and integration that we have amongst Singaporeans, it is unlikely that race will become a factor in the foreseeable.
So, the need to ensure minority race protection is nothing more than a hypothetical argument. In 1988, the PAP government was trying to ‘solve’ a hypothetical problem. Now, let us assume for a moment that minority race representation in Parliament is an issue to be catered for. Is the GRC system necessarily the best way to deal with it? Can’t such protection be ensured through a minimum quota of seats in Parliament? Under the present system, there are 15 GRCs. That translates into a reservation of 15 minority race seats in Parliament. If minority race representation is the true reason for introducing the GRC system, I suggest that a better system of ensuring minority race representation would be to reserve 15 constituencies as minority race seats. Any political party fielding candidates in those constituencies must field a person from a minority race. (I am personally opposed to this idea of creating a quota. But, playing ball with the PAP’s officially stated rationale, an alternative and better approach to the GRC would be a SMC system with a fixed quota for minorities)
What the GRC system really does is that it shields weaker candidates from electoral defeat. Back in 2009 I had blogged about manipulation of the electoral system and in that context the following analysis of Eunos GRC is something stand by still:
“Given the lack of proportionality that is inherent in the system, layering the GRC over it helps to aggravate the disproportionality. With the introduction of the GRC system, it is possible that some MPs that may have lost their individual seats are rescued by stronger candidates in other constituencies. The practice of having a Minister head a GRC team places an apprehension in the minds of voters that if the team loses, the Minister would no longer be able to serve in his office. Weak candidates within the GRC would benefit from the presence of a Minister on their team.
Let us take the Eunos GRC example. In the 1988 elections, Eunos GRC was a 3 member ward. The votes in favour of PAP – 36,500. The votes in favour of WP – 35,221. If the 3 constituencies that were a part of the GRC were single member constituencies in that elections, it is highly likely that at least one of the PAP candidates would have lost his seat. It is likely that Francis Seow would have won a seat in his constituency. In fact, with a vote difference of 1,279 votes, I would not be surprised if 2 PAP MPs had in fact lost to the opposition in the Eunos GRC(if only the Elections Department were to release the detailed results).
The same analysis can be applied to the Eunos GRC of the 1991 elections. This time around it was composed of 4 constituencies. PAP obtained 45,833 votes as opposed to 41,673 for the WP. With a vote difference of 4,160, again it is likely that at least one of the PAP candidates would have lost the seat in a conventional single member seat.
Through the GRC system, the PAP has managed to keep some of its MPs in Parliament where they would otherwise have found it tough going in a single member constituency. The growth in the size and number of GRCs was accompanied by the disappearance of most of the single member constituencies. This is another unique form of electoral management that has ensured the PAP’s continued super-majority in Parliament.”
The fact is that through the GRC system PAP had managed in the early years of its introduction to avoid losing seats in Parliament to candidates that would have posed a serious threat in Parliament such as Francis Seow and Tang Liang Hong. Single member constituencies that were too hot for the PAP to handle such as Bukit Batok, Bukit Gombak and Ulu Pandan (amongst others) were quickly obsorbed into GRCs. The GRCs started growing in size from the original 3 member groups to 5 and 6 member groups. Over time, it has also become evident that the GRC system is a useful way by which the PAP is able to regenerate itself and to train newbies. Every new candidate introduced in a general election by the PAP is shielded by a Minister or two in a GRC. People would generally not dare to vote out a minister and the new candidate would effectively be protected that way. This rationale has been evident in the PAP rhetoric in the last two elections and in fact it was elevated to a new level in this election this year.
PAP ministers have been repeating the warning that a Minister could be lost if voters went against the PAP in a GRC. In the 2006 election, much was made about George Yeo’s experience and credentials as a Foreign Minister. In the 2011 election, we have seen again how the PAP made much ado about the possibility of losing a Minister if Aljunied GRC were to be lost.
So, it has come to pass. Aljunied has been lost to the Workers’ Party. The residents of Aljunied have rejected the PAP’s arguments. The desire for a voice in Parliament has been so overwhelming that the WP team in Aljunied pulled off a vote swing of 10% in a GRC where precincts were moved out into Ang Mo Kio GRC and precincts were brought in from Marine Parade in an attempt by the incumbent to dilute pro-opposition votes.
Low Thia Khiang said on nomination day that it is time to teach the PAP a lesson. Well, the lesson has been delivered. But, has the PAP learnt anything?
And there is one more thing. This election has really exposed the GRC system in a big way. Tin Pei Ling can become an MP. Half a dozen faceless individuals in the PAP ranks can become MPs. But, George Yeo, Tan Jee Say, Vincent Wijeysinha and several other credible individuals can be left out of Parliament. The net effect: the GRC system is inherently inefficient in delivering the best outcome. The most credible candidates would enter Parliament in a straight one to one contest. But, in a system that shields the incompetent, Parliament suffers in quality.
To summarise:
1. I don’t buy the argument that GRCs protect minorities.
2. If we really want to protect minorities, we could have a fixed quota of SMCs for that purpose.
3. GRCs have favoured the PAP because of the all-or-nothing effect that they produce
4. GRCs permit less than competent candidates to enter Parliament through the presence of Ministers
5. When a GRC is lost due to backlash, a good PAP candidate can be lost along with the whole team
There is one more point that I did not make above. The first past the post system that we have inherited from the British is not representative of the votes of the people. The GRC system amplifies this problem and our Parliament has become dramatically unrepresentative. 6 seats out of 87 seats as representation for 40% of the population that voted for the opposition? That is atrocious.
Saturday, April 30, 2011
Ministerial Responsibility, the PAP and the General Elections
We are in a rather curious position in Singapore whereby the General Elections this year could become a referendum on the performance of individual Ministers.
There exists in Commonwealth countries and more particularly in the United Kingdom, the convention of Ministerial Responsibility. The basic premise of the convention is that Ministers are individually accountable to Parliament for their personal conduct, the policies they device and the failures of their respective Ministries. This accountability manifests itself in the form of Parliamentary scrutiny and questioning and often calls for Ministers to demonstrate such responsibility and accountability by resigning from their posts. This would often depend on the severiity of the Ministerial failing.
Three ministers in Singapore could be said to be in line to be held accountable for policy failings or mismanagement: Wong Kan Seng, Mah Bow Tan and Vivian Balakrishnan. Their respective failings in terms of the Mas Selamat escape, the Housing issue and the YOG budget could have been occasions for some blood-letting in countries like the UK. Ministerial resignations may have been in order based on the constitutional concept of Ministerial responsibility.
In Singapore, the 3 Ministers have escaped unscathed. Given that the PAP has an overwhelming majority in Parliament, it is virtually impossible to operate some sort of Ministerial responsibility convention in Singapore. But, Ministerial responsibility in countries like the United Kingdom is a practice that evovled from political pressures rather than a rule that was created for deliberate and consistent enforcement. Given that we are following the Westminster model of government in Singapore, one might expect the convention to apply here as well. However, the political reality of one party dominance has meant that Ministerial responsibility is not a concept that is alive and well.
But, given the way that the election battles are shaping up and the way that opposition teams in the GRCs are angling their arguements, I wouldn't be surprised if Bishan-Toa Payoh GRC, Tampines GRC and Holland-Bukit Timah GRC results represent a form of referendum on the performance of the Ministers. The opposition parties have not been pushing on such an agenda. Nevertheless, it is clear that in many of the rally speeches, the YOG budget, the Mas Selamat escape and the affordability of housing has become a constant refrain.
Assuming the voters are listening carefully and getting the relevant access to information, the aforesaid three GRCs could be turned into a battleground to assess and deliver verdicts on the performance of the 3 ministers. I don't see such a concerted strategy to raise direct Ministerial accountability to the electorate as a GE issue. Some speakers have called upon Ministers to answer for their failings. This is being used as a method of highlighting the fact that the high and mighty PAP has its own flaws and failings. But, the opposition parties could convert the general election agenda into an opportunity for the voters to judge the performance of individual ministers.
Afterall, the PAP has been using the GRC system to scare voters that if they vote out a GRC team, they would lose a Minister. Well, there is nothing stopping us then from considering the election as an opportunity to carry out a performance appraisal of the Minister concerned and throw him out if he has underperformed or made mistakes or his ministry has committed grave errors. The GRC is won on the strength of a Minister. On the strength of a Minister, unknown, untested, inexperienced individuals enter into Parliament. Why can't we then sack the entire GRC team if the Minister has failed in his functions?
Ministerial Responsibility can be ensured by a voter backlash. The opposition parties could ramp it up over the next few days and turn the election in those three GRCs into a referendum. That would be interesting.
There exists in Commonwealth countries and more particularly in the United Kingdom, the convention of Ministerial Responsibility. The basic premise of the convention is that Ministers are individually accountable to Parliament for their personal conduct, the policies they device and the failures of their respective Ministries. This accountability manifests itself in the form of Parliamentary scrutiny and questioning and often calls for Ministers to demonstrate such responsibility and accountability by resigning from their posts. This would often depend on the severiity of the Ministerial failing.
Three ministers in Singapore could be said to be in line to be held accountable for policy failings or mismanagement: Wong Kan Seng, Mah Bow Tan and Vivian Balakrishnan. Their respective failings in terms of the Mas Selamat escape, the Housing issue and the YOG budget could have been occasions for some blood-letting in countries like the UK. Ministerial resignations may have been in order based on the constitutional concept of Ministerial responsibility.
In Singapore, the 3 Ministers have escaped unscathed. Given that the PAP has an overwhelming majority in Parliament, it is virtually impossible to operate some sort of Ministerial responsibility convention in Singapore. But, Ministerial responsibility in countries like the United Kingdom is a practice that evovled from political pressures rather than a rule that was created for deliberate and consistent enforcement. Given that we are following the Westminster model of government in Singapore, one might expect the convention to apply here as well. However, the political reality of one party dominance has meant that Ministerial responsibility is not a concept that is alive and well.
But, given the way that the election battles are shaping up and the way that opposition teams in the GRCs are angling their arguements, I wouldn't be surprised if Bishan-Toa Payoh GRC, Tampines GRC and Holland-Bukit Timah GRC results represent a form of referendum on the performance of the Ministers. The opposition parties have not been pushing on such an agenda. Nevertheless, it is clear that in many of the rally speeches, the YOG budget, the Mas Selamat escape and the affordability of housing has become a constant refrain.
Assuming the voters are listening carefully and getting the relevant access to information, the aforesaid three GRCs could be turned into a battleground to assess and deliver verdicts on the performance of the 3 ministers. I don't see such a concerted strategy to raise direct Ministerial accountability to the electorate as a GE issue. Some speakers have called upon Ministers to answer for their failings. This is being used as a method of highlighting the fact that the high and mighty PAP has its own flaws and failings. But, the opposition parties could convert the general election agenda into an opportunity for the voters to judge the performance of individual ministers.
Afterall, the PAP has been using the GRC system to scare voters that if they vote out a GRC team, they would lose a Minister. Well, there is nothing stopping us then from considering the election as an opportunity to carry out a performance appraisal of the Minister concerned and throw him out if he has underperformed or made mistakes or his ministry has committed grave errors. The GRC is won on the strength of a Minister. On the strength of a Minister, unknown, untested, inexperienced individuals enter into Parliament. Why can't we then sack the entire GRC team if the Minister has failed in his functions?
Ministerial Responsibility can be ensured by a voter backlash. The opposition parties could ramp it up over the next few days and turn the election in those three GRCs into a referendum. That would be interesting.
Labels:
GE 2011,
General Elections,
GRC,
ministerial responsibility,
Opposition,
PAP
Monday, June 22, 2009
Uniquely Singapore: Papmandering
Papmandering: 'The art/science of redrawing electoral boundaries, electoral laws and/or the constitution for the purpose of maintaining overwhelming control of Parliament through the mechanics of clearly articulated arguments in favour of an inclusive form of democracy'
We are familiar with the concept of gerrymandering. It is the process by which electoral boundaries are redrawn to produce a distinct advantage for a candidate. Gerrymandering is possible in a first-past-the-post system whereby voting districts that appear to strongly favour an incumbent can be made to swallow up adjacent voting districts that appear to support opposition candidates.
In most countries employing the first past the post system, the principle governing redistricting or redrawing of constituency boundaries is based on the idea of equal representation for voters. Absolute equality in representation is impossible to achieve. However, boundary commissions/committees attempt to find approximate equality in terms of the MP to voter ratio. Considering that the key reason for boundary changes is to take into account demographic changes either due to migration of voters between constituencies or due to voters reaching the age of majority for voting, one finds it unethical that boundary changes could be used to ensure that an incumbent obtains the right number of votes to secure an election victory.
The word gerrymander itself is a combination of Gerry and Salamander. Governor Elbridge Gerry of Massachusets (USA) redistricted his state in 1812 to benefit his party. In particular, a district in Essex County resembled a Salamander because of the artificial redrawing of boundaries. The editor of the Boston Gazette referred to it as ‘gerrymander’ and the name entered the English lexicon through repeated usage.
The beauty of gerrymandering is that nobody can really prove that the redistricting was a purely political exercise as opposed to the legitimate exercise of ensuring equality in voter representation. In Singapore, many observers view boundary changes cynically even though, to be fair, the voter to MP ratio has been kept reasonably proportionate. Based on current practice, district population deviation is kept to a limit of 30%.
Notable amongst electoral regions that fell prey to redistricting would be Eunos GRC. In the 1997 elections, Eunos GRC was eliminated from the map and its residents were split up into neighbouring districts. In the previous elections, Eunos was hotly contested and the PAP team beat the WP team by 45,833 votes to 41,673 votes. In the 1997 elections, it was Cheng San GRC that was hotly contested and although not quite near the close battle of Eunos GRC, the WP managed to obtain approximately 45% of the votes cast. Cheng San GRC did not feature in the 2001 elections.
I don’t propose a detailed study of boundary changes undertaken in Singapore. There are other studies on this phenomenon. What is fascinating about ‘goal post changing’ in Singapore is not gerrymandering. Obviously, it is a practice that is inevitable and at the same time impossible to prove in the first past the post systems around the world. The fascinating twist in Singapore is the use of the following devices:
a) NCMP
b) NMP
c) GRC
In my opinion, the PAP’s strategy in relation to the trend in the 1980s of increasing opposition support was to provide dissenting voices a platform in Parliament. The PAP rightly sized up the general mood of the public as one that did not seek a change in the status quo overnight. There were hardcore opposition supporters. There were the PAP loyalists. There were those who felt intimidated by the perceived lack of secrecy of the ballot and would therefore vote for the PAP. There were then the voters who occupied the middle ground. These voters have existed in the 1980s and I suspect that they continue to exist. This segment of the population can be persuaded to vote for the opposition. They see the merit of a continuation of the PAP government but have thirsted and still do thirst for a greater diversity of views and voices in Parliament. Psychologically, the ability to vent one’s frustration in the public sphere is a necessity in any society. It is a case of letting off steam.
I suspect that the PAP assessed that by providing a platform for opposition voices in Parliament without allowing these opposition members from becoming fully empowered members of the Parliament they would be able to release some of the pressure that was building up in the 1980s. The Non Constituency MP scheme was a device to permit losing opposition candidates an opportunity to speak in Parliament. By doing this, PAP could tell the people: Look. You wanted us to form the government and you wanted opposition voices in Parliament. We have changed our electoral laws to allow you to continue to vote PAP MPs into Parliament and at the same time have your wish of hearing opposition voices in Parliament.
In the same vein of airing diverse views and in order to prevent public disquiet, the PAP tinkered with Parliamentary composition by introducing the Nominated MP scheme. This time, non partisan individuals could be introduced into Parliament and they could raise the quality of the debate through their knowledge in their respective fields. The PAP would have seen that this would be a way of assuring the public that a multiplicity of views can and will be aired in Parliament. Besides, the PAP might have hoped that the NMPs would appear to be of a ‘better’ calibre than the opposition MPs thereby diminishing the need for people to vote for the opposition.
I see the current proposal of increasing the number of NCMPs to be the latest in this line of tinkering with Parliamentary composition. Given the noticeable social activism in Singapore over the last few years, the PAP must have realised that they risk the possibility of losing a few more seats to the opposition in the next elections. One pre-emptive strategy would be to assure the people that more opposition MPs will get to sit in Parliament through the NCMP scheme. Indirectly, they are telling the electorate again that you don’t have to vote in an opposition MP for your constituency. All you need to do is to continue to have your PAP MPs and as a bonus you will get an increased number of opposition MPs in Parliament. These guys can bark. But they can’t bite.
From a strategic standpoint, PAP would have calculated that the hardcore opposition supporters would continue to vote for the opposition. But the segment of the population that thirsts for a voice can be persuaded to vote for the PAP candidates as they would be assured that there will be a minimum number of opposition candidates who will end up in Parliament even though they lost.
Part of the process of Papmandering therefore involves tweaking Parliamentary composition through amendments to the electoral law as well as to the Constitution. The other part of the process is to magnify the distortion normally produced by the first past the post system. In the first past the post system, it is possible for a party to gain a disproportionately high percentage of seats in Parliament when compared to the popular vote. For instance, a party can get 65% of the popular vote and still manage 80% of the seats in Parliament. In the United Kingdom for instance, every post WWII government with a Parliamentary majority has failed to obtain more than 45% of the popular vote.
Given the lack of proportionality that is inherent in the system, layering the GRC over it helps to aggravate the disproportionality. With the introduction of the GRC system, it is possible that some MPs that may have lost their individual seats are rescued by stronger candidates in other constituencies. The practice of having a Minister head a GRC team places an apprehension in the minds of voters that if the team loses, the Minister would no longer be able to serve in his office. Weak candidates within the GRC would benefit from the presence of a Minister on their team.
Let us take the Eunos GRC example. In the 1988 elections, Eunos GRC was a 3 member ward. The votes in favour of PAP – 36,500. The votes in favour of WP – 35,221. If the 3 constituencies that were a part of the GRC were single member constituencies in that elections, it is highly likely that at least one of the PAP candidates would have lost his seat. It is likely that Francis Seow would have won a seat in his constituency. In fact, with a vote difference of 1,279 votes, I would not be surprised if 2 PAP MPs had in fact lost to the opposition in the Eunos GRC(if only the Elections Department were to release the detailed results).
The same analysis can be applied to the Eunos GRC of the 1991 elections. This time around it was composed of 4 constituencies. PAP obtained 45,833 votes as opposed to 41,673 for the WP. With a vote difference of 4,160, again it is likely that at least one of the PAP candidates would have lost the seat in a conventional single member seat.
Through the GRC system, the PAP has managed to keep some of its MPs in Parliament where they would otherwise have found it tough going in a single member constituency. The growth in the size and number of GRCs was accompanied by the disappearance of most of the single member constituencies. This is another unique form of electoral management that has ensured the PAP’s continued super-majority in Parliament.
To accomplish this feat, the PAP has utilised not only electoral boundary changes but also changes to the electoral law and the Constitution. At every step of the way, the PAP has utilised innovative arguments to substantiate the need for such changes (the need for guaranteed minority representation being one). Many of us are cynical in the way that we view the reasons. But, there are many amongst the electorate who are convinced by the stated reasons.
This process of electoral management is uniquely Singapore and uniquely PAP. It warrants being called Papmandering. Of course, the point to remember is that none of this is unlawful or illegal or unconstitutional.
We are familiar with the concept of gerrymandering. It is the process by which electoral boundaries are redrawn to produce a distinct advantage for a candidate. Gerrymandering is possible in a first-past-the-post system whereby voting districts that appear to strongly favour an incumbent can be made to swallow up adjacent voting districts that appear to support opposition candidates.
In most countries employing the first past the post system, the principle governing redistricting or redrawing of constituency boundaries is based on the idea of equal representation for voters. Absolute equality in representation is impossible to achieve. However, boundary commissions/committees attempt to find approximate equality in terms of the MP to voter ratio. Considering that the key reason for boundary changes is to take into account demographic changes either due to migration of voters between constituencies or due to voters reaching the age of majority for voting, one finds it unethical that boundary changes could be used to ensure that an incumbent obtains the right number of votes to secure an election victory.
The word gerrymander itself is a combination of Gerry and Salamander. Governor Elbridge Gerry of Massachusets (USA) redistricted his state in 1812 to benefit his party. In particular, a district in Essex County resembled a Salamander because of the artificial redrawing of boundaries. The editor of the Boston Gazette referred to it as ‘gerrymander’ and the name entered the English lexicon through repeated usage.
The beauty of gerrymandering is that nobody can really prove that the redistricting was a purely political exercise as opposed to the legitimate exercise of ensuring equality in voter representation. In Singapore, many observers view boundary changes cynically even though, to be fair, the voter to MP ratio has been kept reasonably proportionate. Based on current practice, district population deviation is kept to a limit of 30%.
Notable amongst electoral regions that fell prey to redistricting would be Eunos GRC. In the 1997 elections, Eunos GRC was eliminated from the map and its residents were split up into neighbouring districts. In the previous elections, Eunos was hotly contested and the PAP team beat the WP team by 45,833 votes to 41,673 votes. In the 1997 elections, it was Cheng San GRC that was hotly contested and although not quite near the close battle of Eunos GRC, the WP managed to obtain approximately 45% of the votes cast. Cheng San GRC did not feature in the 2001 elections.
I don’t propose a detailed study of boundary changes undertaken in Singapore. There are other studies on this phenomenon. What is fascinating about ‘goal post changing’ in Singapore is not gerrymandering. Obviously, it is a practice that is inevitable and at the same time impossible to prove in the first past the post systems around the world. The fascinating twist in Singapore is the use of the following devices:
a) NCMP
b) NMP
c) GRC
In my opinion, the PAP’s strategy in relation to the trend in the 1980s of increasing opposition support was to provide dissenting voices a platform in Parliament. The PAP rightly sized up the general mood of the public as one that did not seek a change in the status quo overnight. There were hardcore opposition supporters. There were the PAP loyalists. There were those who felt intimidated by the perceived lack of secrecy of the ballot and would therefore vote for the PAP. There were then the voters who occupied the middle ground. These voters have existed in the 1980s and I suspect that they continue to exist. This segment of the population can be persuaded to vote for the opposition. They see the merit of a continuation of the PAP government but have thirsted and still do thirst for a greater diversity of views and voices in Parliament. Psychologically, the ability to vent one’s frustration in the public sphere is a necessity in any society. It is a case of letting off steam.
I suspect that the PAP assessed that by providing a platform for opposition voices in Parliament without allowing these opposition members from becoming fully empowered members of the Parliament they would be able to release some of the pressure that was building up in the 1980s. The Non Constituency MP scheme was a device to permit losing opposition candidates an opportunity to speak in Parliament. By doing this, PAP could tell the people: Look. You wanted us to form the government and you wanted opposition voices in Parliament. We have changed our electoral laws to allow you to continue to vote PAP MPs into Parliament and at the same time have your wish of hearing opposition voices in Parliament.
In the same vein of airing diverse views and in order to prevent public disquiet, the PAP tinkered with Parliamentary composition by introducing the Nominated MP scheme. This time, non partisan individuals could be introduced into Parliament and they could raise the quality of the debate through their knowledge in their respective fields. The PAP would have seen that this would be a way of assuring the public that a multiplicity of views can and will be aired in Parliament. Besides, the PAP might have hoped that the NMPs would appear to be of a ‘better’ calibre than the opposition MPs thereby diminishing the need for people to vote for the opposition.
I see the current proposal of increasing the number of NCMPs to be the latest in this line of tinkering with Parliamentary composition. Given the noticeable social activism in Singapore over the last few years, the PAP must have realised that they risk the possibility of losing a few more seats to the opposition in the next elections. One pre-emptive strategy would be to assure the people that more opposition MPs will get to sit in Parliament through the NCMP scheme. Indirectly, they are telling the electorate again that you don’t have to vote in an opposition MP for your constituency. All you need to do is to continue to have your PAP MPs and as a bonus you will get an increased number of opposition MPs in Parliament. These guys can bark. But they can’t bite.
From a strategic standpoint, PAP would have calculated that the hardcore opposition supporters would continue to vote for the opposition. But the segment of the population that thirsts for a voice can be persuaded to vote for the PAP candidates as they would be assured that there will be a minimum number of opposition candidates who will end up in Parliament even though they lost.
Part of the process of Papmandering therefore involves tweaking Parliamentary composition through amendments to the electoral law as well as to the Constitution. The other part of the process is to magnify the distortion normally produced by the first past the post system. In the first past the post system, it is possible for a party to gain a disproportionately high percentage of seats in Parliament when compared to the popular vote. For instance, a party can get 65% of the popular vote and still manage 80% of the seats in Parliament. In the United Kingdom for instance, every post WWII government with a Parliamentary majority has failed to obtain more than 45% of the popular vote.
Given the lack of proportionality that is inherent in the system, layering the GRC over it helps to aggravate the disproportionality. With the introduction of the GRC system, it is possible that some MPs that may have lost their individual seats are rescued by stronger candidates in other constituencies. The practice of having a Minister head a GRC team places an apprehension in the minds of voters that if the team loses, the Minister would no longer be able to serve in his office. Weak candidates within the GRC would benefit from the presence of a Minister on their team.
Let us take the Eunos GRC example. In the 1988 elections, Eunos GRC was a 3 member ward. The votes in favour of PAP – 36,500. The votes in favour of WP – 35,221. If the 3 constituencies that were a part of the GRC were single member constituencies in that elections, it is highly likely that at least one of the PAP candidates would have lost his seat. It is likely that Francis Seow would have won a seat in his constituency. In fact, with a vote difference of 1,279 votes, I would not be surprised if 2 PAP MPs had in fact lost to the opposition in the Eunos GRC(if only the Elections Department were to release the detailed results).
The same analysis can be applied to the Eunos GRC of the 1991 elections. This time around it was composed of 4 constituencies. PAP obtained 45,833 votes as opposed to 41,673 for the WP. With a vote difference of 4,160, again it is likely that at least one of the PAP candidates would have lost the seat in a conventional single member seat.
Through the GRC system, the PAP has managed to keep some of its MPs in Parliament where they would otherwise have found it tough going in a single member constituency. The growth in the size and number of GRCs was accompanied by the disappearance of most of the single member constituencies. This is another unique form of electoral management that has ensured the PAP’s continued super-majority in Parliament.
To accomplish this feat, the PAP has utilised not only electoral boundary changes but also changes to the electoral law and the Constitution. At every step of the way, the PAP has utilised innovative arguments to substantiate the need for such changes (the need for guaranteed minority representation being one). Many of us are cynical in the way that we view the reasons. But, there are many amongst the electorate who are convinced by the stated reasons.
This process of electoral management is uniquely Singapore and uniquely PAP. It warrants being called Papmandering. Of course, the point to remember is that none of this is unlawful or illegal or unconstitutional.
Labels:
elections,
gerrymandering,
GRC,
NCMP,
NMP,
PAP,
papmandering,
singapore
Friday, June 27, 2008
PAP, The Opposition & the Resilience of Singapore
PAP, The Opposition & the Resilience of Singapore
MM Lee’s latest warning about Singapore without the PAP is nothing new. It has always been the election scare tactic. Don’t vote for the opposition because you are bored, because you simply want to rebel, because you just want to voice your discontent over particular issues. You just might vote the PAP out of power and Singapore’s success is wholly attributable to the PAP and without them Singapore will be in ruins.
Firstly, this is intended to be a statement about the calibre of the current opposition. Singaporeans are not unintelligent. We know that the current opposition leaders and their party members do not have the same kind of political experience as the senior members of the PAP. But, a long time ago when the PAP was itself an opposition party, its leaders did not have the political experience of people like the late David Marshall. The point is that given Singapore’s political climate of single party dominance, I would not be able to honestly assert that the opposition members of parliament or the members of opposition parties that are not in parliament have the same experience as the current ministers.
Whilst opposition candidates may not have the experience of leading and running ministerial departments, I don’t think anyone can honestly deny the fact that they have their hearts in the right place. Being critical of the government is not easy in Singapore. Being concerned enough about our fellow citizens to the point of being openly critical of our government is also not easy. And where that concern for the fellow man leads a person to join an opposition party and stand for elections or to become an activist in pushing the envelope insofar as our freedoms are concerned, that person definitely has passion for the nation.
The figures that have arisen as opposition leaders in Singapore from 1981 till the present have taken upon themselves an unenviable task. They have done so and continue to do so despite the political and legal impediments facing them. Their courage must be applauded and as rational beings we must also ask ourselves where such courage could come from. Unless these were men and women of exceptional willpower and passion for the nation, they could not have displayed and could not continue to show such courage.
For the above reasons, I find it difficult to be dismissive about our opposition’s heart. There will be those who say that the heart alone is not sufficient when it comes to leadership, especially leadership of the nation. I will concede that experience counts for sure. But, passion is a precondition for effective leadership. We are not talking about corporate management here. We are talking about a country and its citizens; each one of whom is a living, breathing human being with dreams and hopes. Leaders must not be elitist, other-worldly technocrats. Leaders must connect with the deeper concerns of the common man.
Our First Cabinet was not composed of men of great experience. They were men of great passion and vision. MM Lee was one of them. His passion and the passion of his generation of leaders guided the passion of that generation of adults; the adults of the 60s and 70s who were instrumental in producing the Singapore miracle.
When we look for the next generation of leaders who would lead Singapore forward, I dare say that it would be such passion for the nation that would be of incalculable value.
Secondly, we all know that the PAP is not going to go out of power all of a sudden. As much as I am not frightened by such a prospect, I know that there are many Singaporeans who shudder at the thought of a ‘freak’ election victory for the opposition. (note: it is only freak from the PAP’s perspective. One has to be in power for a long time before formulating a view that the people’s verdict is somehow misguided in order for it to be labelled as ‘freak’) The opposition has for some time been adopting what has been termed as the bye-election strategy. They openly declared this as a strategy when they rightly assessed the feeling on the ground. Many people wanted to have their voices heard. But, they didn’t want the PAP to be out of power. By contesting less than half the seats in Parliament, the opposition has been delivering election victories to the PAP on nomination day. Election day was presented by the opposition as an opportunity for people to send more opposition MPs to Parliament.
That opposition strategy has been neutered in part by GRC system. Each GRC team is led by a minister. The loss of a team equates to the loss of a minister. The worries that voters may have had about change in government was effectively channelled towards a worry that a minister might be sacrificed if a GRC team was voted out. Even then voters fired brave salvos in the form of Eunos GRC and Cheng San GRC albeit unsuccessfully.
The point that I am getting at is that a ‘freak’ election victory for the opposition is not possible under the bye-election strategy. Even if the PAP had lost all the seats contested in the last elections, they would have still formed the government. There would have been a sizeable opposition in Parliament that would have been able to keep the Ministers on the toes. Other PAP MPs would replace those Ministers that had lost their parliamentary seats. I am sure the PAP is not going to say that their MPs don’t have that calibre. Such an argument would be counter-productive for the party.
When more and more opposition members gain a foothold in Parliament, they would have ample opportunity to gain political experience and their parties would be better able to build up a shadow government. A shadow government would be the ultimate step in building an effective alternative to the PAP. Having an effective alternative to the PAP is a priority for us as citizens. We cannot assume that good governance is a given. We cannot assume that good governance will always be a PAP trademark. What if the PAP slackens? What if there is complacency? What if there is negligent leadership? We will, in the end, blame ourselves for not having an effective alternative ready and able to take over from the PAP. We will blame ourselves for the mother of all complacencies: electoral complacency.
Voters need to be far-sighted and realise that the gradual rise of opposition MPs in Parliament will be better for Singapore’s future.
Thirdly, and this was clearly not intended by MM Lee, the warning unintentionally implies a lack of faith in our Civil Service. Imagine this scenario. Take away all our existing Ministers. Place all the opposition party leaders in Ministerial positions. The system is not going to grind to a halt. There is a reason why Civil Servants are expected to be neutral and non-partisan. Political parties may come and go. Ministers may come and go. But, the civil servants are always there. They are the ones that ensure the smooth transition of power from one government to the next. Ministers themselves don’t have insights into the workings of a Ministry without the input of their civil servants. To worry about a ‘freak’ election result is to worry about the resilience of our civil service. I believe it is robust enough to carry on functioning effectively whatever party may come to power. If the PAP’s worry is that policy shifts may harm the country’s prosperity, then this is an argument about the policies that are best for the country. These policies will vary from party to party and the policy issues raised by the different parties ought to be debated effectively and openly in public. If the PAP’s worry is about experience in leadership, then I would backtrack to my earlier comments.
The confluence of a robust, resilient and experienced Civil Service and an opposition with passion for the nation (minus the experience) would produce sufficient conditions for the continued positive evolution of our society and nation.
There is one further point that I want to make and I will draw it from a conversation a few days ago. My mother-in-law remarked whilst watching the news that we continue to be able to live with a roof over our heads because MM Lee is still alive. That might very easily be the view of her generation. I’m sure my parents would readily agree. I too, for my part, would not refute the contributions of MM Lee and his generation of leaders. But, too often, the meta-narrative of this nation tends to underplay the contributions of an entire generation of ordinary citizens: the adults of the 1960s and 1970s. The hardest work of nation-building was done by them. They are our unsung heroes.
In the history of any nation or society, its resilience is not dependant on its leaders. Its resilience is found in the collective will of its people. Leaders marshal that will. They don’t exist independent of that collective will.
MM Lee’s latest warning about Singapore without the PAP is nothing new. It has always been the election scare tactic. Don’t vote for the opposition because you are bored, because you simply want to rebel, because you just want to voice your discontent over particular issues. You just might vote the PAP out of power and Singapore’s success is wholly attributable to the PAP and without them Singapore will be in ruins.
Firstly, this is intended to be a statement about the calibre of the current opposition. Singaporeans are not unintelligent. We know that the current opposition leaders and their party members do not have the same kind of political experience as the senior members of the PAP. But, a long time ago when the PAP was itself an opposition party, its leaders did not have the political experience of people like the late David Marshall. The point is that given Singapore’s political climate of single party dominance, I would not be able to honestly assert that the opposition members of parliament or the members of opposition parties that are not in parliament have the same experience as the current ministers.
Whilst opposition candidates may not have the experience of leading and running ministerial departments, I don’t think anyone can honestly deny the fact that they have their hearts in the right place. Being critical of the government is not easy in Singapore. Being concerned enough about our fellow citizens to the point of being openly critical of our government is also not easy. And where that concern for the fellow man leads a person to join an opposition party and stand for elections or to become an activist in pushing the envelope insofar as our freedoms are concerned, that person definitely has passion for the nation.
The figures that have arisen as opposition leaders in Singapore from 1981 till the present have taken upon themselves an unenviable task. They have done so and continue to do so despite the political and legal impediments facing them. Their courage must be applauded and as rational beings we must also ask ourselves where such courage could come from. Unless these were men and women of exceptional willpower and passion for the nation, they could not have displayed and could not continue to show such courage.
For the above reasons, I find it difficult to be dismissive about our opposition’s heart. There will be those who say that the heart alone is not sufficient when it comes to leadership, especially leadership of the nation. I will concede that experience counts for sure. But, passion is a precondition for effective leadership. We are not talking about corporate management here. We are talking about a country and its citizens; each one of whom is a living, breathing human being with dreams and hopes. Leaders must not be elitist, other-worldly technocrats. Leaders must connect with the deeper concerns of the common man.
Our First Cabinet was not composed of men of great experience. They were men of great passion and vision. MM Lee was one of them. His passion and the passion of his generation of leaders guided the passion of that generation of adults; the adults of the 60s and 70s who were instrumental in producing the Singapore miracle.
When we look for the next generation of leaders who would lead Singapore forward, I dare say that it would be such passion for the nation that would be of incalculable value.
Secondly, we all know that the PAP is not going to go out of power all of a sudden. As much as I am not frightened by such a prospect, I know that there are many Singaporeans who shudder at the thought of a ‘freak’ election victory for the opposition. (note: it is only freak from the PAP’s perspective. One has to be in power for a long time before formulating a view that the people’s verdict is somehow misguided in order for it to be labelled as ‘freak’) The opposition has for some time been adopting what has been termed as the bye-election strategy. They openly declared this as a strategy when they rightly assessed the feeling on the ground. Many people wanted to have their voices heard. But, they didn’t want the PAP to be out of power. By contesting less than half the seats in Parliament, the opposition has been delivering election victories to the PAP on nomination day. Election day was presented by the opposition as an opportunity for people to send more opposition MPs to Parliament.
That opposition strategy has been neutered in part by GRC system. Each GRC team is led by a minister. The loss of a team equates to the loss of a minister. The worries that voters may have had about change in government was effectively channelled towards a worry that a minister might be sacrificed if a GRC team was voted out. Even then voters fired brave salvos in the form of Eunos GRC and Cheng San GRC albeit unsuccessfully.
The point that I am getting at is that a ‘freak’ election victory for the opposition is not possible under the bye-election strategy. Even if the PAP had lost all the seats contested in the last elections, they would have still formed the government. There would have been a sizeable opposition in Parliament that would have been able to keep the Ministers on the toes. Other PAP MPs would replace those Ministers that had lost their parliamentary seats. I am sure the PAP is not going to say that their MPs don’t have that calibre. Such an argument would be counter-productive for the party.
When more and more opposition members gain a foothold in Parliament, they would have ample opportunity to gain political experience and their parties would be better able to build up a shadow government. A shadow government would be the ultimate step in building an effective alternative to the PAP. Having an effective alternative to the PAP is a priority for us as citizens. We cannot assume that good governance is a given. We cannot assume that good governance will always be a PAP trademark. What if the PAP slackens? What if there is complacency? What if there is negligent leadership? We will, in the end, blame ourselves for not having an effective alternative ready and able to take over from the PAP. We will blame ourselves for the mother of all complacencies: electoral complacency.
Voters need to be far-sighted and realise that the gradual rise of opposition MPs in Parliament will be better for Singapore’s future.
Thirdly, and this was clearly not intended by MM Lee, the warning unintentionally implies a lack of faith in our Civil Service. Imagine this scenario. Take away all our existing Ministers. Place all the opposition party leaders in Ministerial positions. The system is not going to grind to a halt. There is a reason why Civil Servants are expected to be neutral and non-partisan. Political parties may come and go. Ministers may come and go. But, the civil servants are always there. They are the ones that ensure the smooth transition of power from one government to the next. Ministers themselves don’t have insights into the workings of a Ministry without the input of their civil servants. To worry about a ‘freak’ election result is to worry about the resilience of our civil service. I believe it is robust enough to carry on functioning effectively whatever party may come to power. If the PAP’s worry is that policy shifts may harm the country’s prosperity, then this is an argument about the policies that are best for the country. These policies will vary from party to party and the policy issues raised by the different parties ought to be debated effectively and openly in public. If the PAP’s worry is about experience in leadership, then I would backtrack to my earlier comments.
The confluence of a robust, resilient and experienced Civil Service and an opposition with passion for the nation (minus the experience) would produce sufficient conditions for the continued positive evolution of our society and nation.
There is one further point that I want to make and I will draw it from a conversation a few days ago. My mother-in-law remarked whilst watching the news that we continue to be able to live with a roof over our heads because MM Lee is still alive. That might very easily be the view of her generation. I’m sure my parents would readily agree. I too, for my part, would not refute the contributions of MM Lee and his generation of leaders. But, too often, the meta-narrative of this nation tends to underplay the contributions of an entire generation of ordinary citizens: the adults of the 1960s and 1970s. The hardest work of nation-building was done by them. They are our unsung heroes.
In the history of any nation or society, its resilience is not dependant on its leaders. Its resilience is found in the collective will of its people. Leaders marshal that will. They don’t exist independent of that collective will.
Labels:
civil service,
elections,
freak results,
GRC,
MM Lee Kwan Yew,
Opposition,
PAP
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