2012: Constitutionally speaking

2011 was a watershed year in the politics of Singapore.  With the General Elections and Presidential Elections sending strong signals to the ruling PAP and with the empowering effect of social media, the scene was set for an interesting 2012.

Much has happened in the political arena.  The PAP would probably place emphasis on the National Conversation as a major political highlight.  Most citizens would probably remember this year as the year of sex in politics and the civil service.  I am sure there must be plenty of other mainstream and social media perspectives on the year that has just whizzed past us.  I don't plan to cover the same ground.  Perhaps a survey of Constitutional developments might be of some interest.

From a Constitutional standpoint, this has been an interesting year.  There have been some developments in the law and not all of them are positive from the perspective of citizens' rights. 

THE HOUGANG BY-ELECTION CASE

This was a case that was waiting to happen.  There have been several instances in the past when the ruling PAP has avoided by-elections.  Ever since the dramatic loss of the Anson seat to the Workers' Party in 1981, the default mode of the PAP has been to resist any calls for a by-election when a seat became vacant. 

Prior to the Hougang by-election case, there was one attempted Constitutional challenge when the Bukit Batok seat fell vacant in 2008 due to the death of Dr Ong Chit Chung.  A claim was filed in Court and eventually withdrawn when the claimant (a Bukit Batok resident) decided not to proceed with the case after his lawyer J.B Jeyaretnam passed away.  Bukit Batok was part of a GRC and so the legal issues there were slightly different.

http://article14.blogspot.sg/2008/07/is-constitution-redundant.html

When Mdm Vellamma instituted judicial review proceedings in relation to the PM's discretion in calling for by-elections, it is probably true to say that tremendous political pressure fell on the PM's shoulders.  In a GRC it was possible for the PM to claim that the other MPs would 'cover' the responsibilities of Dr Ong.  But, Hougang is a single member constituency and clearly the PM could not go on a default mode of givng a template response.  http://article14.blogspot.sg/2012/02/bye-yaw-and-now-for-by-election.html

With the application for leave being granted by the High Court and the attempt by the government to have the case thrown out being unsuccessful, there must have been a significant fear in the PM's office that the Constitutional interpretation would work to constrain the PM's discretion.  A by-election was called and I honestly expected that Mdm Vellamma would drop the case.  But, the case proceeded nevertheless.  http://article14.blogspot.sg/2012/04/houngang-by-election-case-decision-to.html
http://article14.blogspot.sg/2012/05/hougang-by-election-26-may-2012.html
http://article14.blogspot.sg/2012/05/hougang-by-election-case-may-be.html


The final judgment by the High Court is most unfortunate for the citizens of Singapore and for the status of our country as a democracy.  In a highly technical approach to the reading of our Constitution, the High Court ruled that the PM has unfettered discretion in deciding on whether to hold a by-election.  I disagree with the Court's reasoning and I have set that out my views here: http://article14.blogspot.sg/2012/12/the-hougang-by-election-case-belated.html

As a direct consequence of the decision, the legal position today is that a vacant Parliamentary seat need not be filled and it can remain vacant till the next general election. 

Since Mdm Vellamma lost her case, the AG requested for an order of costs against her.  The default mode in the Court is that 'costs follow the event'.  That is just lawyers' language for 'legal costs to be paid by the losing party to the winning party.'  Incindentally, judges do have discretion to deviate from this norm and this has been done in the United Kingdom.  (Our Rules of Court are modelled on the English Rules.) 

In a landmark ruling the same High Court judge that dismissed Mdm Vellamma's case found in favour of Mdm Vellamma on the costs issue.  As her case involved a matter of public interest, the Court saw it fit to rule that no costs would be payable even though she lost the case. 

As a consequence of this ruling, Singaporeans have been given the hope that they can safely proceed with judicial review on matters of general public interest and will not be penalised in costs if they lose the case eventually. 

THE IMF LOAN CASE

There is something seriously wrong about the politico-legal order in our country when we have an official rationale for the existence of an Elected President (as an additional check against potential Executive abuse of the reserves) and at the same time a rather cavelier attitude on the government's part when it comes to giving out loans to foreign institutions. 

Most observers reading our Constitution would walk away with the impression that any loan given by our government to a foreign entity is required to be subject to Presidential scrutiny.  But, what appears logical to an ordinary individual can often be seen very differently by lawyers.  This was one such instance.  Though personally I am in favour of subjecting loans by the Singapore government to Parliamentary scrutiny (at the very least), the truth is that the High Court judgment in this case is one that is, at least, consistent with the background to Art 144 of the Constitution.  I would have preferred a different approach by the Court by relying on the need for restrictive interpretation of the Constitution when it comes to Executive powers so that the Rule of Law can be preserved. 

Today, as a result of the IMF loan case, our government needs to seek Presidential approval for the giving of a guarantee and the raising of a loan.  But, there is no need for such approaval for the giving of a loan and the raising of a guarantee.

Another issue arising out of the High Court's decision in this case concerns 'locus standi'.  The Court has ruled that the applicant Kenneth Jeyaretnam had no locus standi to bring this claim because the claim was in relation to a public right and the claimant had to show that he suffered some special damage.  This is effectively a bar on any future claim by a citizen alleging any breach of Article 144. 
http://article14.blogspot.sg/2012/10/the-day-constitution-died-again.html

The effect of this case is that in future, the Executive might breach Article 144 by raising a loan or giving a guarantee without Presidential or Parliamentary scrutiny and citizens would be left without legal recourse.

THE GAY RIGHTS CASE

Tan Eng Hong v AG as decided by the Court of Appeal represents a significant postive step in the interpretation of our Constitution.  At the present stage of the proceedings, there hasn't been any final determination on the Constitutionality of s.377A of the Penal Code.  But, the Court of Appeal has made two rulings of significance. 

S.377A is a pre-independance provision and it pre-dates our Constitution. The AG attempted to argue that s.377A cannot be declared to be void because it is a pre-1965 law.  The Court of Appeal has rejected this. http://article14.blogspot.sg/2012/08/from-gay-rights-to-rights-of-all.html


It is now clear that all statutes that violate the Constitution can be declared to be void and it does not matter whether the statute existed prior to the Constitution.  

The second significance of this case is that the very existence of an unconstitutional statute can sometimes give rise to the violation of the rights of an individual.  So, even if a person has not been prosecuted under s.377A, that person can still bring an action to challenge the Constitutionality of the law. 

The case has general significance in all cases involving the validity of statutes (where there has been a contravention of the Constitution).  A citizen does not have to wait to have his rights violated before bringing a challenge against the statute. 
http://article14.blogspot.sg/2012/08/rights-come-alive-tan-eng-hong-v-ag.html


All of these three cases are still alive.  The decisions in the Hougang by-election case and the IMF case have been appealed against.  Tan Eng Hong will go before the High Court for a determination on the constitutionality of s.377A. 

There is much to watch out for in 2013. 

Happy new year. 

The day the Constitution died (again)

To begin with, we don't have much of a Constitution to speak of.  Ours is not a liberal Constitution peppered with extensive safeguards against the abuse of power.  Our Constitution does attempt to limit the exercise of power and there are many restrictions on what the respective organs of state may or may not do.  But, there are enough provisions that allow the state to claim expansive powers and enough provisions to allow for the restriction of citizens rights. 

But, whatever we might say about our (amendment-ravaged) Constitution, the fact remains that it is a document that is a starting point for any discussion in law about the extent of the state's power and the extent of the citizen's rights.   There are 'silences' in many provisions that enable legroom for a pro-citizen instead of a pro-state interpretation. (Just realised that 'pro-state' unhyphenated is prostate.  There is an accidental link between intellectual alignment with the powers that be and a part of the anatomy near the testicular region. Sorry about this unnecessary and irrelevant digression. :-) )

That brings me to the IMF loan case.  Kenneth Jeyaretnam, the leader of the Reform Party, brought an application to the High Court for the Court to rule on the legality of the Singapore government's decision to pledge a loan to the IMF.  I wasn't surprised by the decision of the Court.  The Court has ruled as follows:

"Art 144(1) was obviously intended to apply to the raising of loans and not the giving of loans. It follows that the approval of Parliament and the concurrence of the President are not required for the Loan. As such, the present application did not disclose a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion in favour of granting the remedies sought and it could not be said that there appeared to be a point which might, on further consideration, turn out to be an arguable case in favour of granting to the applicant the relief claimed. On this ground alone, the application for leave must be dismissed."

At issue in the case was the question of whether the government required Presidential/Parliamentary approval for the raising and giving of loans.  Kenneth contended that approval is needed for both.  The government contended that approval is only needed for the raising of a loan and not the giving of a loan.  The reason for the contention is the mode of interpretation to be employed.  Kenneth's Counsel argued for a literal interpretation of the Constitution relying on the ordinary dictionary meaning of the words employed.  The government relied on a purposive interpretation. (This is a technique of statutory interpretation where a law is interpreted on the basis of the objectives of Parliament in enacting the provision; i.e. looking at the 'purpose' behind the provision.)

The Court has obviously accepted the purposive interpretation.  The actual provision in question is:

"Article 144.
—(1) No guarantee or loan shall be given or raised by the Government —
(a)except under the authority of any resolution of Parliament with which the President concurs"



The Court is of the view that Article 144 prohibits the giving of a guarantee and the raising of a loan and not the other way around.  I have blogged about this earlier and have mentioned that this is a technical legal possibility.  http://www.article14.blogspot.sg/2012/06/singapores-pledge-of-us-4-billion-to.html

So, no surprises as to the result.  If so, why do  I say that the Constitution has died.  Well, there is another concern that I have about the High Court decision.  This is a far more serious matter with far-reaching consequences.  The Court has decided that Kenneth Jeyaretnam does not have the locus standi to make a claim.  (locus standi - the standing of the party.  the question as to whether the person has the right to make a particular claim in court.)

Ordinarily, if the case is one involving a private interest, there is little difficulty in establishing locus standi.  But, if the issue is one of public interest, the law hasn't been clear in Singapore.  The English Courts (from whom we adopt this concept) have moved ahead to give a broad application for locus standi in public interest cases.  Tan Lee Meng J stated the following at paragraph 42 of the judgment:

"The English position on locus standi in relation to the enforcement of public rights has become more liberal. In Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] 1 AC 617, Lord Diplock stated (at 644) as follows:

It is not, in my view, a sufficient answer to say that judicial review of the actions of officers or departments of central government is unnecessary because they are accountable to Parliament for the way in which they carry out their functions. They are accountable to Parliament for what they do so far as regards efficiency and policy, and of that Parliament is the only judge; they are responsible to a court of justice for the lawfulness of what they do, and of that the court is the only judge. "


The judge went on to look at the Malaysian position in Government of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang.  In the end, the decision of the Court was to decide along the lines of the Malaysian case.  (In any event, the Malaysian case appears to have been given a nod to by our Court of Appeal in PP v Tan Eng Hong recently.)

On that basis, the High Court has now decided that Kenneth does not have the locus standi to pursue this case:

"an applicant in a case involving a public right should certainly be required to show that he had suffered special damage as a result of the public act being challenged and that he had a genuine private interest to protect or further."


The impact of this decision is that in future, any judicial review case involving a public interest will require special damage to be suffered by a citizen before it can be brought before the Court.  And so, one possible avenue of ensuring Constitutional governance is closed.  And so too, our Constitution has died. 

Of course, one might just as well cynically conclude that it was not a living document to begin with.  To be alive, the Constitution must not merely be a bunch of words on a piece of paper.  To be alive, the Constitution must be imbued with the spirit of a people and the values of a nation.  With so much to question about whether we have a coherent set of values or that there is a certain Singapore spirit and in fact, with so much to question as to whether we are even a coherent collection of individuals capable of being collectively referred to as a 'people' and even so much to question whether we are a 'nation', the question of a living Constitution probably doesn't arise.  If something is not alive, it can't die, can it?

Everybody's talking about talking

The hottest topic of the season on the local blogosphere is the 'National Conversation'.   Everyboy's talking about why we need to have the Nat-Con, what is the government's agenda, how we can contribute to it, etc, etc.  If it was intended to be the National Distraction, I think it is succeeding.  Nat-con is the political equivalent of a viral YouTube video.  (I am having images in my mind of PM doing a dance a la Gangnam Style.)

I also suspect that just like a viral video, in this fast-paced, low-memory-capacity age, this Nat-Con phase will die out soon enough. 

In the meantime, what are we missing out? 

Well, the Auditor General has dropped a bombshell and almost nobody has noticed the explosion with the lone exception of Kenneth Jeyaretnam.  Kudos to Kenneth for having had the patience to run through the AGO's report which is available here: http://www.ago.gov.sg/doc/ar-1112.pdf  Most of us, including myself, would tend to give boring financial stuff a miss.  (I guess it is good to have a finance guy in the opposition.)

Kenneth has done an excellent job on his blog in highlighting a Constitutional breach by the Ministry of Finance.  http://sonofadud.com/2012/08/30/auditor-general-mof-breached-constitution-article-144-in-january-2012/

The relevant part of the AGO's report that highlights the Constitutional breach goes as follows:

"President's Concurrence Not Obtained for Promissory Note Issued

33.   The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Revsed Edition) includes safeguards to protect the past reserves of the Government.  One such safeguard, set out in Article 144 of the Constitution, requires the President's concurrence for the granting of certain loans and guarantees. 

34.   AGO found that the Ministry of Finance did not comply with Art 144 of the Constitution when it issued a promissory note without obtaining the required President's concurrence.  The promissory note for US $16.34 million was issued on 4 January 2012 to the International Development Association.  In March 2012, the Association encashed US$2.94 million from the note.

35.  The Ministry explained that the President's concurrence was not sought because of an administrative oversight stemming from an officer's lack of familiarity with the relevant processess needed for such a transaction, which occurred infrequently.  Following AGO's observation, the Ministry took immediate steps to rectify the matter. 

36.   The Ministry subsequently obtained the President's concurrence and issued a fresh promissory note in place of the one issued on 4 January 2012 which is invalid.  There was no draaw on past reserves as the Ministry had made the cash payment of US$2.94 from its own operating expenditure budget for the financial year 2011/12.  The Ministry has reviewed its internal processes and tightened its standard operating procedures to prevent similar occurrences in the future."


Art 144 is of particular interest to me as it involves one of the powers of the Elected President that is clearly acknowledged by everyone along the entire political spectrum in Singapore to be the discretionary power of the President.  Whilst there might be argument about other powers (whether stipulated or not in the Constitution), it is clear that the President is not in any way constrained by the Cabinet in relation to Art 144. 

When the decision of the Singapore government to grant a loan to IMF was announced on 20th April 2012, I blogged about the possibility that Art 144 may have been infringed:
http://article14.blogspot.sg/2012/04/that-us-4-billion-to-imf-is-it.html

I followed that up with another post where I speculated about the possible government defence.  There is an Alice-in-wonderland argument (passable as a matter of legal logic even if it may defy common sense) that was used by the government in 1997 when confronted by questions from JB Jeyaretnam about a loan to Indonesia.  I have addressed this here: http://article14.blogspot.sg/2012/06/singapores-pledge-of-us-4-billion-to.html.  The gist of the government's argument (as presented by the then Attorney General) was that the Constitution prohibits the raising of a loan and the giving of a guarantee without the President's consent and that it does not prohibit the giving of a loan or the raising of a guarantee.  Art 144 is as follows:

Article 144.
—(1) No guarantee or loan shall be given or raised by the Government —
(a)except under the authority of any resolution of Parliament with which the President concurs;
(b)under the authority of any law to which this paragraph applies unless the President concurs with the giving or raising of such guarantee or loan; or
(c)except under the authority of any other written law

I am not sure if the AG's chambers will resurrect this old argument in the IMF loan case (Kenneth Andrew Jeyaretnam v Attorney General).  The way that their Affidavit is drafted, there is little indication of whether they would assert that the giving of a loan is not prohibited by th Constitution. 

Given the fact that the Auditor General considers any loan advanced without Presidential approval to be unconstitutional and void, (and given the fact that even the Ministry of Finance appears not to have disputed that in the case of the Promissory Note to the International Development Association) any argument by the Attorney General in the IMF case that the giving of a loan does not require Presidential approval will be highly inconsistent.  It is clear that the MOF thought that the lack of Presidential approval for the promissory note was an oversight.  It is also clear that the Attorney General in 1997 argued that no Presidential approval was needed for the loan to Indonesia. 

It will be interesting to see how the arguments play out in Court. 

As for words and the meaning of words and the causing of words to mean a thing other than the meaning of words, here is something from Alice in Wonderland:


'And only one for birthday presents, you know. There's glory for you!'
'I don't know what you mean by "glory",' Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. 'Of course you don't — till I tell you. I meant "there's a nice knock-down argument for you!"'
'But "glory" doesn't mean "a nice knock-down argument",' Alice objected.
'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.'
'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.'
'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master — that's all.'

The IMF Loan and the Office of the President

Much was debated during the Presidential Elections in 2011 about the power of the Elected President in Singapore.  There were those that argued for a fully intrusive and almost combative role for the President in scrutinising the executive arm of government.  There were those that argued that the Elected President's role was no more than that which is fulfilled by the Queen of England as the Head of State (with the exception of a constitutionally reserved discretion when it came to the use of our reserves).  Others (like myself) contended that where the constitution was silent, the President could take a pro-active role and that this may be politically necessitated by the fact that the President could carry the mandate of the electorate (giving rise to the evolution of a constitutional convention). 

Whatever the shades of argument, one thing was very clear: There was no dispute as to whether the President had discretionary powers in relation to the matters specifically stipulated in the Constitution. An example of such stipulations could be found in Article 144(1) of our Constitution.   

That brings us to the issue surrounding the IMF loan pledged by the Singapore government.  Firstly, this is not part of the current subscription payable to IMF.  It is clearly an additional loan.  Leaving aside the contentious issue of interpretation of whether or not a loan given by the government is required under Article 144(1) to be subject to the President's approval, it is clear that a circumstance that falls within the ambit of Article 144(1) triggers one of the discretionary powers of the President. 

When Kenneth Jeyaretnam recently wrote to the President to seek clarification as to whether his consent was sought, the President has reportedly responded by stating that his permission had not been sought. http://sonofadud.com/2012/06/21/the-truth-about-that-imf-loan/

Kenneth has also stated that the President has referred this matter to MAS.  I would have expected something more proactive from the President.  Several questions arise in my mind.  Was the President fully appraised of his powers under Article 144(1)?  What is the interpretation of that provision that the President himself subscribes to?  Does the President agree with the view expressed in 1997 by the AG that a loan received by the government has to be approved and that a loan given by the government does not need to be approved? (http://www.article14.blogspot.sg/2012/06/singapores-pledge-of-us-4-billion-to.html)  If he agrees with that interpretation, could he not have informed Kenneth Jeyaretnam that the Article 144(1) issue does not arise and that his consent was not necessary?  Did the President have any specific reaction to the government's decision to grant the loan to IMF?  Did he ponder about whether he had a role in the process?  Or was he only going to exercise the discretion to grant consent when consent was requested? 

This is an important point to ponder about when we consider the role of the President.  There is no doubt that Article 144(1) deals with an area of the President's discretionary power.  Since we do elect our President and since the bare minimum that we might expect him to do in relation to his responsibilities is the safeguarding of the reserves and since Article 144(1) deals with such express discretionary power, there should be a strong expectation on the part of the electorate that the President carry out his Constitutional duties actively.  So, I hope that President Tony Tan had a clear understanding of Article 144(1) and that he was aware of the potential for the IMF loan to fall foul of that Article and that he actively addressed his mind to it and then decided that his consent was not necessary as the issue did not fall within the ambit of the Article.  Nothing less than that will do. That is the minimum expectation that we as the electorate should have in relation to the Elected President. 

Who got the facts wrong? Kenneth Jeyaretnam or the MICA Press Secretary?

I did a double take when I read the rebuttal letter written by Mr Peer M Akbar to the Wall Street Journal. Firstly, a little bit of context: On 7th March 2012, a letter written by Kenneth Jeyaretnam to the Wall Street Journal was published. "Challenging Singapore’s Defamation Laws" In that letter, Mr Jeyaretnam made reference to his father's bankruptcy. The relevant part of the letter is as follows:

"As The Wall Street Journal is aware, my father, Reform Party founder Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam, was sued numerous times for defamation, culminating in being bankrupted over a few words in an article published in the Workers’ Party newspaper that he did not write and in a language (Tamil) whose written form he did not understand. This resulted in him losing his seat in Parliament and not being able to stand again before he died..."

My observation: KJ makes no reference to the timing of the defamation suit involving that article in the "Hammer" which was written in Tamil. He states that JBJ's bankruptcy resulted from a suit arising out of the Tamil article in the "Hammer". This bankruptcy resulted in him losing the seat in Parliament. I don't remember the events very accurately. But, I have a vague recollection that JBJ was in Parliament when he was declared bankrupt and that resulted in his disqualification. I also remember that there was a suit by some members of the Indian community against JBJ and one of the chaps was a lawyer. I used to hear a fair amount of Bar room talk about that lawyer being instrumental in JBJ's bankruptcy. So, Kenneth Jeyaretnam's letter did not shock me or surprise me. On 12 March 2012, Peer Akbur (the Press Secretary to the Minister for Information, Communications and the Arts) attempted a rebuttal of KJ's letter. The full letter is as follows:

Defending Singapore’s Defamation Laws 12 March 2012 Mr. Kenneth Jeyaretnam’s Mar. 7 letter to the editor, “Challenging Singapore’s Defamation Laws,” misrepresents basic facts. The article that he referred to was published in the August 1995 issue of the Workers’ Party publication The Hammer. J.B. Jeyaretnam was then the secretary-general of the party. The author of the article, the editor of The Hammer, and the Executive Council of the Workers’ Party (of which J.B. Jeyaretnam was a member) acknowledged that the article was “completely false and baseless” and accepted responsibility for it. They published an unqualified apology in The Straits Times on Nov. 23, 1995 and agreed to pay costs and damages. Contrary to Mr. Kenneth Jeyaratnam’s claim, this episode did not cause J.B. Jeyaretnam to lose his seat in parliament—he was not even a member of parliament at that time. Nor did it prevent J.B. Jeyaretnam from contesting the subsequent general elections in 1997, and being selected as a non-constituency member of parliament. Singapore holds its public officials to the highest standards of probity and integrity. Ministers and officials who have committed offences have been charged and jailed. Court judgments in all these cases are published, and fully open to scrutiny. At the same time, ministers who are defamed will sue to clear their name and take the stand to be cross examined. The right of individuals to protect their reputation is as important as free speech. In a healthy democracy, vigorous political debate does not involve defamatory attacks. In Singapore’s 2011 general elections, the same Workers’ Party that J.B. Jeyaretnam once led achieved its best performance since independence, with several MPs elected into parliament. It faced no lawsuits. Mr. Kenneth Jeyaretnam and his party also contested the general elections, albeit less successfully. . Peer M. Akbur Press Secretary to the Minister for Information, Communications and the Arts

This article caused me to question my own memory. On the face of it, everything appeared to be factually accurate. A quick check on the net showed that in 1995 JBJ was not in Parliament. He entered Parliament again in 1997 as a Non-Constituency MP via Cheng San GRC. So, MICA's assertion appeared to be accurate and KJ appeared to have got his facts mixed up. But, I was confused. I still carried a vague memory of the bankruptcy resulting from that particular claim. Thank God for the internet, I have proof postive that I have my memory and sanity intact. Firstly, this is a Reuters article reproduced by "Singapore-Window": Secondly, in 2009 the Ministry of Law had responded to a White Paper on Repression of Political Freedoms in Singapore by Amsterdam and Peroff. In that response, under Annex 2 the following assertions were made by the Ministry:

Mr Jeyaretnam’s bankruptcy in 2001 had nothing to do with the Government. It arose from a defamation action brought against Mr Jeyaretnam by the Organising Committee for the 1995 Tamil Language Week, the majority of whom were not politicians. They had argued that Mr Jeyaretnam had committed a very serious libel when he alleged that the Committee was seeking political gains by “nakedly prostituting itself”. Mr Jeyaretnam refused to withdraw or apologise when sued. The court found against him and ordered him to pay damages, but he was unable to pay. Mr Jeyaretnam also had other outstanding debts. Arising from the bankruptcy, Mr Jeyaretnam’s expulsion from Parliament followed due process as provided for under Article 46(2) of the Singapore Constitution. As a bankrupt, Mr Jeyaretnam would have been disqualified from practicing as a solicitor; however, he had not renewed his practicing certificate and had ceased to practise law at the point of his bankruptcy.

So, the facts as the turn out.... KJ was not wrong in his assertion about the defamatory article that led to his father's bankruptcy. Peer Akbur is wrong to state that the episode did not result in JBJ losing his seat in Parliament. It did result in the loss of the Parliamentary seat. In fact, I would have expected the MICA response to play the safe tune that MinLaw played which was to state that the bankruptcy was not brought on by a defamation suit by the PAP leaders but rather by members of the Organising Committee for the Tamil Language Week. Mr Peer Akbur. You have to do better fact checking than that when you are trying to represent the Ministry's position. It's ok. It is not too late to come forward and say that you stand corrected. :-)