2012: Constitutionally speaking

2011 was a watershed year in the politics of Singapore.  With the General Elections and Presidential Elections sending strong signals to the ruling PAP and with the empowering effect of social media, the scene was set for an interesting 2012.

Much has happened in the political arena.  The PAP would probably place emphasis on the National Conversation as a major political highlight.  Most citizens would probably remember this year as the year of sex in politics and the civil service.  I am sure there must be plenty of other mainstream and social media perspectives on the year that has just whizzed past us.  I don't plan to cover the same ground.  Perhaps a survey of Constitutional developments might be of some interest.

From a Constitutional standpoint, this has been an interesting year.  There have been some developments in the law and not all of them are positive from the perspective of citizens' rights. 

THE HOUGANG BY-ELECTION CASE

This was a case that was waiting to happen.  There have been several instances in the past when the ruling PAP has avoided by-elections.  Ever since the dramatic loss of the Anson seat to the Workers' Party in 1981, the default mode of the PAP has been to resist any calls for a by-election when a seat became vacant. 

Prior to the Hougang by-election case, there was one attempted Constitutional challenge when the Bukit Batok seat fell vacant in 2008 due to the death of Dr Ong Chit Chung.  A claim was filed in Court and eventually withdrawn when the claimant (a Bukit Batok resident) decided not to proceed with the case after his lawyer J.B Jeyaretnam passed away.  Bukit Batok was part of a GRC and so the legal issues there were slightly different.

http://article14.blogspot.sg/2008/07/is-constitution-redundant.html

When Mdm Vellamma instituted judicial review proceedings in relation to the PM's discretion in calling for by-elections, it is probably true to say that tremendous political pressure fell on the PM's shoulders.  In a GRC it was possible for the PM to claim that the other MPs would 'cover' the responsibilities of Dr Ong.  But, Hougang is a single member constituency and clearly the PM could not go on a default mode of givng a template response.  http://article14.blogspot.sg/2012/02/bye-yaw-and-now-for-by-election.html

With the application for leave being granted by the High Court and the attempt by the government to have the case thrown out being unsuccessful, there must have been a significant fear in the PM's office that the Constitutional interpretation would work to constrain the PM's discretion.  A by-election was called and I honestly expected that Mdm Vellamma would drop the case.  But, the case proceeded nevertheless.  http://article14.blogspot.sg/2012/04/houngang-by-election-case-decision-to.html
http://article14.blogspot.sg/2012/05/hougang-by-election-26-may-2012.html
http://article14.blogspot.sg/2012/05/hougang-by-election-case-may-be.html


The final judgment by the High Court is most unfortunate for the citizens of Singapore and for the status of our country as a democracy.  In a highly technical approach to the reading of our Constitution, the High Court ruled that the PM has unfettered discretion in deciding on whether to hold a by-election.  I disagree with the Court's reasoning and I have set that out my views here: http://article14.blogspot.sg/2012/12/the-hougang-by-election-case-belated.html

As a direct consequence of the decision, the legal position today is that a vacant Parliamentary seat need not be filled and it can remain vacant till the next general election. 

Since Mdm Vellamma lost her case, the AG requested for an order of costs against her.  The default mode in the Court is that 'costs follow the event'.  That is just lawyers' language for 'legal costs to be paid by the losing party to the winning party.'  Incindentally, judges do have discretion to deviate from this norm and this has been done in the United Kingdom.  (Our Rules of Court are modelled on the English Rules.) 

In a landmark ruling the same High Court judge that dismissed Mdm Vellamma's case found in favour of Mdm Vellamma on the costs issue.  As her case involved a matter of public interest, the Court saw it fit to rule that no costs would be payable even though she lost the case. 

As a consequence of this ruling, Singaporeans have been given the hope that they can safely proceed with judicial review on matters of general public interest and will not be penalised in costs if they lose the case eventually. 

THE IMF LOAN CASE

There is something seriously wrong about the politico-legal order in our country when we have an official rationale for the existence of an Elected President (as an additional check against potential Executive abuse of the reserves) and at the same time a rather cavelier attitude on the government's part when it comes to giving out loans to foreign institutions. 

Most observers reading our Constitution would walk away with the impression that any loan given by our government to a foreign entity is required to be subject to Presidential scrutiny.  But, what appears logical to an ordinary individual can often be seen very differently by lawyers.  This was one such instance.  Though personally I am in favour of subjecting loans by the Singapore government to Parliamentary scrutiny (at the very least), the truth is that the High Court judgment in this case is one that is, at least, consistent with the background to Art 144 of the Constitution.  I would have preferred a different approach by the Court by relying on the need for restrictive interpretation of the Constitution when it comes to Executive powers so that the Rule of Law can be preserved. 

Today, as a result of the IMF loan case, our government needs to seek Presidential approval for the giving of a guarantee and the raising of a loan.  But, there is no need for such approaval for the giving of a loan and the raising of a guarantee.

Another issue arising out of the High Court's decision in this case concerns 'locus standi'.  The Court has ruled that the applicant Kenneth Jeyaretnam had no locus standi to bring this claim because the claim was in relation to a public right and the claimant had to show that he suffered some special damage.  This is effectively a bar on any future claim by a citizen alleging any breach of Article 144. 
http://article14.blogspot.sg/2012/10/the-day-constitution-died-again.html

The effect of this case is that in future, the Executive might breach Article 144 by raising a loan or giving a guarantee without Presidential or Parliamentary scrutiny and citizens would be left without legal recourse.

THE GAY RIGHTS CASE

Tan Eng Hong v AG as decided by the Court of Appeal represents a significant postive step in the interpretation of our Constitution.  At the present stage of the proceedings, there hasn't been any final determination on the Constitutionality of s.377A of the Penal Code.  But, the Court of Appeal has made two rulings of significance. 

S.377A is a pre-independance provision and it pre-dates our Constitution. The AG attempted to argue that s.377A cannot be declared to be void because it is a pre-1965 law.  The Court of Appeal has rejected this. http://article14.blogspot.sg/2012/08/from-gay-rights-to-rights-of-all.html


It is now clear that all statutes that violate the Constitution can be declared to be void and it does not matter whether the statute existed prior to the Constitution.  

The second significance of this case is that the very existence of an unconstitutional statute can sometimes give rise to the violation of the rights of an individual.  So, even if a person has not been prosecuted under s.377A, that person can still bring an action to challenge the Constitutionality of the law. 

The case has general significance in all cases involving the validity of statutes (where there has been a contravention of the Constitution).  A citizen does not have to wait to have his rights violated before bringing a challenge against the statute. 
http://article14.blogspot.sg/2012/08/rights-come-alive-tan-eng-hong-v-ag.html


All of these three cases are still alive.  The decisions in the Hougang by-election case and the IMF case have been appealed against.  Tan Eng Hong will go before the High Court for a determination on the constitutionality of s.377A. 

There is much to watch out for in 2013. 

Happy new year. 

The day the Constitution died (again)

To begin with, we don't have much of a Constitution to speak of.  Ours is not a liberal Constitution peppered with extensive safeguards against the abuse of power.  Our Constitution does attempt to limit the exercise of power and there are many restrictions on what the respective organs of state may or may not do.  But, there are enough provisions that allow the state to claim expansive powers and enough provisions to allow for the restriction of citizens rights. 

But, whatever we might say about our (amendment-ravaged) Constitution, the fact remains that it is a document that is a starting point for any discussion in law about the extent of the state's power and the extent of the citizen's rights.   There are 'silences' in many provisions that enable legroom for a pro-citizen instead of a pro-state interpretation. (Just realised that 'pro-state' unhyphenated is prostate.  There is an accidental link between intellectual alignment with the powers that be and a part of the anatomy near the testicular region. Sorry about this unnecessary and irrelevant digression. :-) )

That brings me to the IMF loan case.  Kenneth Jeyaretnam, the leader of the Reform Party, brought an application to the High Court for the Court to rule on the legality of the Singapore government's decision to pledge a loan to the IMF.  I wasn't surprised by the decision of the Court.  The Court has ruled as follows:

"Art 144(1) was obviously intended to apply to the raising of loans and not the giving of loans. It follows that the approval of Parliament and the concurrence of the President are not required for the Loan. As such, the present application did not disclose a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion in favour of granting the remedies sought and it could not be said that there appeared to be a point which might, on further consideration, turn out to be an arguable case in favour of granting to the applicant the relief claimed. On this ground alone, the application for leave must be dismissed."

At issue in the case was the question of whether the government required Presidential/Parliamentary approval for the raising and giving of loans.  Kenneth contended that approval is needed for both.  The government contended that approval is only needed for the raising of a loan and not the giving of a loan.  The reason for the contention is the mode of interpretation to be employed.  Kenneth's Counsel argued for a literal interpretation of the Constitution relying on the ordinary dictionary meaning of the words employed.  The government relied on a purposive interpretation. (This is a technique of statutory interpretation where a law is interpreted on the basis of the objectives of Parliament in enacting the provision; i.e. looking at the 'purpose' behind the provision.)

The Court has obviously accepted the purposive interpretation.  The actual provision in question is:

"Article 144.
—(1) No guarantee or loan shall be given or raised by the Government —
(a)except under the authority of any resolution of Parliament with which the President concurs"



The Court is of the view that Article 144 prohibits the giving of a guarantee and the raising of a loan and not the other way around.  I have blogged about this earlier and have mentioned that this is a technical legal possibility.  http://www.article14.blogspot.sg/2012/06/singapores-pledge-of-us-4-billion-to.html

So, no surprises as to the result.  If so, why do  I say that the Constitution has died.  Well, there is another concern that I have about the High Court decision.  This is a far more serious matter with far-reaching consequences.  The Court has decided that Kenneth Jeyaretnam does not have the locus standi to make a claim.  (locus standi - the standing of the party.  the question as to whether the person has the right to make a particular claim in court.)

Ordinarily, if the case is one involving a private interest, there is little difficulty in establishing locus standi.  But, if the issue is one of public interest, the law hasn't been clear in Singapore.  The English Courts (from whom we adopt this concept) have moved ahead to give a broad application for locus standi in public interest cases.  Tan Lee Meng J stated the following at paragraph 42 of the judgment:

"The English position on locus standi in relation to the enforcement of public rights has become more liberal. In Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] 1 AC 617, Lord Diplock stated (at 644) as follows:

It is not, in my view, a sufficient answer to say that judicial review of the actions of officers or departments of central government is unnecessary because they are accountable to Parliament for the way in which they carry out their functions. They are accountable to Parliament for what they do so far as regards efficiency and policy, and of that Parliament is the only judge; they are responsible to a court of justice for the lawfulness of what they do, and of that the court is the only judge. "


The judge went on to look at the Malaysian position in Government of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang.  In the end, the decision of the Court was to decide along the lines of the Malaysian case.  (In any event, the Malaysian case appears to have been given a nod to by our Court of Appeal in PP v Tan Eng Hong recently.)

On that basis, the High Court has now decided that Kenneth does not have the locus standi to pursue this case:

"an applicant in a case involving a public right should certainly be required to show that he had suffered special damage as a result of the public act being challenged and that he had a genuine private interest to protect or further."


The impact of this decision is that in future, any judicial review case involving a public interest will require special damage to be suffered by a citizen before it can be brought before the Court.  And so, one possible avenue of ensuring Constitutional governance is closed.  And so too, our Constitution has died. 

Of course, one might just as well cynically conclude that it was not a living document to begin with.  To be alive, the Constitution must not merely be a bunch of words on a piece of paper.  To be alive, the Constitution must be imbued with the spirit of a people and the values of a nation.  With so much to question about whether we have a coherent set of values or that there is a certain Singapore spirit and in fact, with so much to question as to whether we are even a coherent collection of individuals capable of being collectively referred to as a 'people' and even so much to question whether we are a 'nation', the question of a living Constitution probably doesn't arise.  If something is not alive, it can't die, can it?

What's wrong with you Mr Wong?

During the time that I was practising (and even thereafter), I had not come across any instance where a Law Society representive turned up in a court to raise the issue of the competency of a lawyer to carry on with the proceedings.  As lawyers, we are hung up (more than anything else) on procedural rules.  Being mindful of procedure is second nature to lawyers.  It was, therefore, surprising to find out that Mr Wong Siew Hong (the head of the sub-committee for Member Care in the Law Society), turned up in court with a letter written by a medical professional.  (The propriety of that disclosure by the medical professional is a separate issue and ought to be properly examined by the Singapore Medical Council.  But, there might be justification based on a pre-existing direction for M Ravi to be examined by a medical professional in relation to his condition.)

What shocked me the most was the fact that whilst Mr Wong might be characterised as having had "good intentions" (as stated by the Law Society), it is unpardonable that after being rebuffed by Justice Pillai in the morning, he still proceeded to adopt the same method of interfering with proceedings in two other matters involving M Ravi's firm.  It does not help that the 3 cases that he attempted to intervene in were political cases.  Public perception of the Law Society is bound to get seriously damaged by these actions of Wong. 

The three attempted interventions (based on reports that have surfaced so far):

a)  The Hougang by-election case
b)  The SDP illegal assembly case
c)   The IMF loan judicial review case

Of course, it might have in all probability been a mere coincidence that on the day that Wong received information of M Ravi's condition, there were legal proceedings with political overtones going on.  But, the problem is that as a matter of public perception, Wong's real intention doesn't matter.  He should have addressed his mind to this and not acted hastily.  Fine.  He may have lapsed somewhat when he turned up before Justice Pillai.  He might have sincerely felt that he was duty bound to alert the court of Ravi's condition so as to protect the interest of the litigant.  But, after Justice Pillai had rightly pointed out that Ravi has a valid practising certificate and the Court would not enquire beyond that, Wong should have gotten back to the LS Council to take the proper procedural steps.  Instead, Wong attempted (reportedly) on two further occasions to intervene in Ravi's court proceedings. 

I am glad that the President of the Law Society has come forward to clarify that Wong acted on his own volition.  At this stage I do not expect the Law Society to publicly chastise Wong.  But, after thoroughly investigating this fiasco, the Law Society must in some way take Wong to task.  The legal profession does not look very good when a Law Society representative goes on a frolic of his own to intervene in court proceedings without making any formal application.  The fact that Wong did not cease in his intervention attempt despite a rebuff from Justice Pillai is unacceptable whichever way one might try to justify it as a case of  'good intentions'. 

The Law Society itself got its facts wrong initially (which was itself somewhat comedic).  But, I am willing to cut the Society some slack on that.  But, some action is needed to drive home the point that Wong's repeated attempts at intervention in Ravi's proceedings is not the kind of conduct that the Law Society is willing to condone.

The IMF Loan and the Office of the President

Much was debated during the Presidential Elections in 2011 about the power of the Elected President in Singapore.  There were those that argued for a fully intrusive and almost combative role for the President in scrutinising the executive arm of government.  There were those that argued that the Elected President's role was no more than that which is fulfilled by the Queen of England as the Head of State (with the exception of a constitutionally reserved discretion when it came to the use of our reserves).  Others (like myself) contended that where the constitution was silent, the President could take a pro-active role and that this may be politically necessitated by the fact that the President could carry the mandate of the electorate (giving rise to the evolution of a constitutional convention). 

Whatever the shades of argument, one thing was very clear: There was no dispute as to whether the President had discretionary powers in relation to the matters specifically stipulated in the Constitution. An example of such stipulations could be found in Article 144(1) of our Constitution.   

That brings us to the issue surrounding the IMF loan pledged by the Singapore government.  Firstly, this is not part of the current subscription payable to IMF.  It is clearly an additional loan.  Leaving aside the contentious issue of interpretation of whether or not a loan given by the government is required under Article 144(1) to be subject to the President's approval, it is clear that a circumstance that falls within the ambit of Article 144(1) triggers one of the discretionary powers of the President. 

When Kenneth Jeyaretnam recently wrote to the President to seek clarification as to whether his consent was sought, the President has reportedly responded by stating that his permission had not been sought. http://sonofadud.com/2012/06/21/the-truth-about-that-imf-loan/

Kenneth has also stated that the President has referred this matter to MAS.  I would have expected something more proactive from the President.  Several questions arise in my mind.  Was the President fully appraised of his powers under Article 144(1)?  What is the interpretation of that provision that the President himself subscribes to?  Does the President agree with the view expressed in 1997 by the AG that a loan received by the government has to be approved and that a loan given by the government does not need to be approved? (http://www.article14.blogspot.sg/2012/06/singapores-pledge-of-us-4-billion-to.html)  If he agrees with that interpretation, could he not have informed Kenneth Jeyaretnam that the Article 144(1) issue does not arise and that his consent was not necessary?  Did the President have any specific reaction to the government's decision to grant the loan to IMF?  Did he ponder about whether he had a role in the process?  Or was he only going to exercise the discretion to grant consent when consent was requested? 

This is an important point to ponder about when we consider the role of the President.  There is no doubt that Article 144(1) deals with an area of the President's discretionary power.  Since we do elect our President and since the bare minimum that we might expect him to do in relation to his responsibilities is the safeguarding of the reserves and since Article 144(1) deals with such express discretionary power, there should be a strong expectation on the part of the electorate that the President carry out his Constitutional duties actively.  So, I hope that President Tony Tan had a clear understanding of Article 144(1) and that he was aware of the potential for the IMF loan to fall foul of that Article and that he actively addressed his mind to it and then decided that his consent was not necessary as the issue did not fall within the ambit of the Article.  Nothing less than that will do. That is the minimum expectation that we as the electorate should have in relation to the Elected President. 

That US 4 billion to the IMF: Is it unconstitutional?

On 20th April 2012, the Monetary Authority of Singapore announced that Singapore will give a "bilateral loan of US$4 billion to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as part of the broader international effort to provide the Fund with sufficient resources to tackle crisis and promote global economic and financial stability."

Let me just state at the outset that I am not going to question the wisdom of such a move. I can see the need for the global community to rally together to hold steadfast against any future economic crisis. Some would question whether this is nothing more than an exercise in futility. In fact, in the United Kingdom (where the government has pledged 10 billion pounds), several ruling party MPs have started questioning the wisdom of providing such a backup to the IMF. Peter Bone (MP from the Conservative Party) said: "We might as well put £10billion in the nearest litter bin.” There is a sense in which this move is seen as money down the drain and an exercise in futility even if it may appear to be well-intentioned.

The Shadow Chancellor, Ed Balls (of the opposition Labour Party) had this to say: "The IMF has a vital role to play in the global economy and should have the resources to do that job, but it should not be bailing out the eurozone when the euro area countries are not doing their own bit to help themselves." "The IMF cannot and should not become the de facto central bank of the euro area." "The IMF is being put up to step in and play the role that the European Central Bank should be playing - a strategy which cannot work and is self-defeating by highlighting the lack of a proper ECB firewall." I can see the validity in this proposition that IMF should not do ECB's job.

Meanwhile, back in Singapore, we have mundane news reports of a mere 4 billion US dollars being pledged to the IMF. I am rather curious about the status of this loan commitment from a legal standpoint. Under our Constitution, there are some restrictions on loans and guarantees provided by the government. Article 144 of the Constitution is as follows:

Article 144.
—(1) No guarantee or loan shall be given or raised by the Government —
(a)except under the authority of any resolution of Parliament with which the President concurs;
(b)under the authority of any law to which this paragraph applies unless the President concurs with the giving or raising of such guarantee or loan; or
(c)except under the authority of any other written law.
(2) The President, acting in his discretion, may withhold his assent to any Bill passed by Parliament providing, directly or indirectly, for the borrowing of money, the giving of any guarantee or the raising of any loan by the Government if, in the opinion of the President, the Bill is likely to draw on the reserves of the Government which were not accumulated by the Government during its current term of office.

The present issue of the loan to IMF comes under Clause 1(b). The Constitution makes reference to specific laws under which loans may be given and one such statute listed at Clause 3 is the Bretton Woods Agreement Act (Cap 27). Subscription payments to the IMF and other monetary commitments to the IMF are covered by the Bretton Woods Agreement. Given this fact, the Constitution clearly prohibits at Clause 1(b) above any loan given to the IMF without the President's consent.

I wonder if the President was consulted. I wonder if he has given his consent. Given that this is one of the areas of the President's discretionary powers and given the fact that he is an Elected President, I would expect some transparency and accountability here simply in the form of an official request for the President's consent and the President's communication of such consent with reasons stated. This would ensure that the people can judge the President's record when it comes to the next Presidential Election. What decisions did he make in relation to his discretionary powers? How did he justify those decisions? Are the justifications acceptable? These are important questions and can't be brushed aside on the bare assertion that our President is like the Queen of England and that he carries out his functions behind closed doors. Our President is Elected (and not appointed or a hereditary title holder) and these are part of his discretionary powers for which he was elected.

Thus I have 2 issues with the current loan to the IMF. (1) A guarantee or a loan without the President's consent will be unlawful. (2) If the President has consented, can we have an official statement from Istana?